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ARE FEDERAL EXONEREES PAID?: 
LESSONS FOR THE DRAFTING AND 
INTERPRETATION OF WRONGFUL CONVICTION 
COMPENSATION STATUTES 
 




In this third of a series of articles on wrongful conviction compensation statutes, 
Professor Jeffrey Gutman tackles the first statute attempted to be passed in the United 
States – the federal wrongful conviction compensation statute. Championed in concept 
by Edwin Borchard, it was in fact poorly drafted, and recommendations by Attorney 
General Homer Cummings to improve it were only partly successful. This Article 
retraces the long legislative history of the statute which is dotted with sloppy language 
and reasoning, unexplained amendments and an unfortunate focus on who was not to 
benefit from it, rather than who was. This tangled legislative history has resulted in 
two lines of cases, which either interpret it and the statute faithfully with poor results 
or rebel against it yielding better results as a matter of policy, but with dubious 
statutory support. 
Based on his empirical research, Professor Gutman reveals that of 118 people 
listed in the National Registry of Exonerations as having been exonerated of federal 
crimes, only two have been awarded compensation under it. He demonstrates that a 
combination of unnecessary and ill-considered statutory language and an overreading 
of the legislative history have yielded results unmoored from Professor Borchard’s 
modest vision of the statute.   
Professor Gutman argues that the often-misread legislative history’s concern about 
compensating those whose convictions were set aside on technical or procedural 
grounds has led several courts to misconceive the plaintiff’s burden of showing their 
innocence. This manner of approaching the question of innocence, what Professor 
Gutman calls “room thinking” requires petitioners to disprove all evidence of guilt – 
the grounds upon which there remains “room” for concluding that the exoneree may 
still be guilty. He contends that this approach is inconsistent with the established 
preponderance of the evidence standard and should be replaced by a familiar burden 
shifting analysis that will result in more balanced judicial decision-making in difficult 
cases. 
 
* Professor of Clinical Law at The George Washington University Law School. The author 
wishes to thank Deans Chris Bracey and Dayna Matthew of George Washington University 
Law School for providing a research grant to support the writing of this article, Maurice Possley 
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compensation statutes. And, a special thanks to Wrenne Bartlett and Saroja Koneru whose 
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Last, Professor Gutman explores a petition for a certificate of innocence litigated 
in Wisconsin which provides a unique opportunity to stress-test each of the three 
principal prongs of the statute. The result of that successful petition, which could have 
foundered on any of the required prongs, is surprising. Examination of that case and a 
comparison to state wrongful conviction compensation statutes, results in Professor 
Gutman’s concrete proposals for the amendment of the statute and its administration 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The 2019 decision by the Justice Department to reinstate the federal death penalty1 
and the subsequent spate of executions carried out by the Trump administration2 have 
refocused attention on federal exonerees – those people who have been exonerated of 
federal crimes for which they were wrongly convicted. In contrast to those exonerated 
of state crimes, many of whom have received far more press coverage, exposure on 
podcasts, TV shows, movies and academic attention,3 federal exonerees remain a 
largely invisible group.   
The National Registry of Exonerations4 lists 118 exonerees who were wrongfully 
convicted of federal crimes and exonerated since 1989.5 Apart from former CIA agent 
Edwin Wilson, who was wrongfully convicted of exporting explosives to Libya,6 and 
former Senator Ted Stevens of Alaska, whose convictions for failing to report gifts 
 
1 Press Release, Dep’t of Just., Federal Government to Resume Capital Punishment After 
Nearly Two Decade Lapse (July 25, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/federal-
government-resume-capital-punishment-after-nearly-two-decade-lapse 
[https://perma.cc/RR3F-WGLD]; see Roane v. Barr (In re Fed. Bureau of Prisons’ & Execution 
Protocol Cases), 955 F.3d 106, 124 (D.C. Cir. 2020); see also Bourgeois v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 180, 
180 (2020) (mem.). 
2 Michael Tarm & Michael Kunzelman, Trump Administration Carries out 13th and Final 
Execution, AP NEWS (Jan. 15, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/donald-trump-wildlife-
coronavirus-pandemic-crime-terre-haute-28e44cc5c026dc16472751bbde0ead50 
[https://perma.cc/75Y2-BGPF]; Aris Foley, Federal Government Carries out 13th and Final 
Execution Under Trump, HILL (Jan. 16, 2021, 8:32 AM), 
https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/534555-federal-government-carries-out-13th-
and-final-execution-under-trump [https://perma.cc/9STV-9CZC]; Madeleine Carlisle, In a Year 
Marked by Death, the Trump Administration Cements a Legacy of Unprecedented Executions, 
TIME (Dec. 30, 2020, 9:48 AM), https://time.com/5923973/trump-executions-death-penalty-
covid-19/ [https://perma.cc/NST7-DGSC]. 
3 Jeffrey S. Gutman, An Empirical Reexamination of State Statutory Compensation for the 
Wrongly Convicted, 82 MO. L. REV. 369, 437 (2017); Jeffrey S. Gutman & Lingxiao Sun, Why 
Is Mississippi the Best State in Which to Be Exonerated? An Empirical Evaluation of State 
Statutory and Civil Compensation for the Wrongfully Convicted, 11 NE. U. L. REV. 694, 696 
(2019); Adele Bernhard, Justice Still Fails: A Review of Recent Efforts to Compensate 
Individuals Who Have Been Unjustly Convicted and Later Exonerated, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 703, 
711 (2004); Adele Bernhard, A Short Overview of the Statutory Remedies for the Wrongly 
Convicted: What Works, What Doesn't and Why, 18 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 403, 415 (2009). 
4 NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, 
http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/about.aspx [https://perma.cc/EJC5-
ZWCV]. The data set forth in this Article is accurate as of January 1, 2021. 
5 Six were convicted in a military tribunal and are excluded from this analysis. This number 
compares to 2,588 exonerees wrongfully convicted in state court as of January 1, 2021. 
6 Maurice Possley, Edwin Wilson, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, 
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3452 
[https://perma.cc/4DBP-DGRZ] (last updated Sept. 11, 2015). 
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were set aside,7 this group of exonerees is little known because, on the whole, their 
stories are less compelling. They average 2.5 years of imprisonment, compared to 9.4 
years for state exonerees.8 Forty-five never served time at all; forty-eight were 
wrongly convicted of white-collar crimes.9 Only six were convicted of murder or 
sexual assault.10 Just one was exonerated as a result of DNA analysis.11     
Yet, analysis of federal exonerees teaches important lessons about the drafting and 
interpretation of the statute intended to compensate them. The history of the federal 
wrongful conviction compensation statute dates back to 1912 and stands as the first 
effort, state or federal, to pass such a statute in the United States.12 That initial effort 
was unsuccessful, but a statute authorizing $5,000 in compensation for wrongful 
conviction and subsequent incarceration was passed in 1938.13 Since then, the statute 
has served as a model for some parallel state statutes that award compensation to those 
wrongly convicted in state court.     
The crafting of wrongful conviction compensation statutes begins with a 
conception of those who are “deserving.” The drafting challenge is to create a process 
and a set of standards to ensure that those deemed deserving are always and quickly 
compensated while precluding compensation for those regarded as undeserving. The 
first champion of wrongful conviction compensation, Edwin Borchard, offered a 
modest notion of the “deserving”14 and, even so, his 1912 draft of the statute failed 
that challenge. His poorly worded statute was virtually impossible to satisfy. 
In Part II of this Article, I trace the lengthy history of the federal wrongful 
conviction compensation statute, which owes its passage to Borchard, and the bizarre 
wrongful murder conviction of a Hungarian immigrant who received post-exoneration 
financial support from an unusual source. While Borchard receives appropriate credit 
as the father of the statute, it was actually FDR’s Attorney General, Homer Cummings, 
who had a more clear-eyed understanding of how it might work in practice. Congress’ 
failure to adopt Cummings’ suggestions on how to improve the statute continues to 
plague it. 
 
7 Maurice Possley, Ted Stevens, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS (June 2012), 
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3663 
[https://perma.cc/RDB5-BD2S]. 




12 S. 7675, 62d Cong., 49 CONG. REC. 356 (1912). 
13 Act of May 24, 1938, ch. 266, Pub. L. No. 75-539, 52 Stat. 438 (current version at 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1495, 2513); see Edwin M. Borchard, State Indemnity for Errors of Criminal Justice, 
21 B.U. L. REV. 201, 201 (1941).  
14 Borchard himself used the terms “deserving” and “undeserving.” EDWIN M. BORCHARD, 
EUROPEAN SYSTEMS OF STATE INDEMNITY FOR ERRORS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, S. DOC. NO. 62-
974, at 14 (1912). 
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol69/iss2/5
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In Part III, I show that, perhaps not coincidentally, only two federal exonerees 
listed in the National Registry have received compensation under the statute. In Part 
IV, I return to Borchard’s original concept and highlight the flaws in the drafting of 
the statute. While the statute took over two decades to pass, the key explanations of 
its language and purpose are set forth in brief and, in part, illogical passages of the 
legislative history. Ill-conceived language combined with this tangled legislative 
history have led to two distinct and conflicting approaches to the interpretation of the 
statute. 
The first interpretation adheres closely to the text of the statute and yields results 
unfavorable to plaintiffs, and outcomes unmoored from even Borchard’s modest 
conception of the statute’s appropriate scope. The second interpretation bristles 
against restrictive text and results in outcomes better as a matter of policy, but dubious 
as a matter of statutory interpretation. Changes to the language of the statute can 
resolve some of these issues, but I argue that there is a deeper problem in play that is 
not susceptible to a solution through redrafting. 
I contend that an overreading of the statute’s legislative history has led to 
interpretations that rest on the statute’s presumed narrowness rather than its 
humanitarian purpose. The clearest manifestation of this approach lies in courts’ 
assessments of the most important statutory requirement – whether a plaintiff has 
demonstrated their innocence. Several courts have implicitly departed from a standard 
that requires the plaintiff to show their innocence by a preponderance of the evidence.  
Instead, they have adopted what I call “room thinking,” in which they seize on pieces 
of inculpatory evidence and the plaintiff’s failure to refute all evidence of guilt. With 
“room” to conclude that they may be guilty, these courts deny the requests for a 
certificate of innocence that is required for compensation.   
In Part V, I highlight these statutory and interpretive issues by discussing the 
obscure case of Mhummad Abu-Shawish, the director of a non-profit, who had hoped 
to redevelop a stretch of Milwaukee’s Muskego Avenue and ended up serving three 
years in prison. Abu-Shawish has remarkably overcome both statutory and interpretive 
barriers in his quest for a certificate of innocence. In Part VI, I offer thoughts on how 
cases like that of Abu-Shawish suggest changes to the language of the statute and to 
approaches to its interpretation and implementation in a manner that redeems 
Professor Borchard’s and Attorney General Cummings’ vision of the federal wrongful 
conviction compensation statute and its state counterparts.   
II. THE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL WRONGFUL CONVICTION COMPENSATION 
STATUTE 
A. 1912 
In 1911, a wrongful conviction splashed across the newspaper headlines of the 
day. Andrew Toth, a Hungarian immigrant and steelworker in one of Andrew 
Carnegie’s mills, was exonerated of a murder that occurred in the mill during labor 
unrest.15 Another man, coincidentally also named Toth, belatedly admitted to the 
crime on his death bed in Hungary.16 The whole Toth saga would likely never have 
 
15 Carnegie Pensions Toth. Man Who Served Twenty Years for Crime He Did Not Commit, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 1911, at 1.  
16 David J. Krajicek, Andrew Carnegie’s Iron Grip of Greed – The Saga of ‘Praying Andy’ 
Toth, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Sept. 5, 2010), https://www.nydailynews.com/news/crime/andrew-
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2021
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come to light were it not for Carnegie’s well-publicized decision to provide Toth, who 
returned to Hungary after his exoneration, a $40 per month pension when the 
Pennsylvania legislature refused to compensate him.17 
 A proposal for a federal wrongful conviction compensation statute quickly 
followed in 1912 when the British-born Senator George Sutherland of Utah, who later 
served for nearly sixteen years as an Associate Justice of the United States Supreme 
Court, introduced a bill for “Relief of Persons Erroneously Convicted.”18 The bill and 
accompanying report was drafted by Edwin Borchard, then the Law Librarian of the 
Library of Congress and leading early advocate for wrongful conviction 
compensation.19   
Borchard’s 1912 report was called “State Indemnity for Errors of Criminal 
Justice,”20 and was, as we will see, excerpted in subsequent legislative reports through 
the 1930s. In the first sentence of the report he noted, “[i]n an age when social justice 
is the watchword of legislative reform, it is strange that society, at least in this country, 
utterly disregards the plight of the innocent victim of unjust conviction or detention in 
criminal cases.”21 
The report is principally a survey of how European countries have “solved the 
problem of indemnifying those innocent individuals who, in the exercise of a 
sovereign right beneficial to society and to the State in its function as the preserver of 
 
carnegie-iron-grip-greed-saga-praying-andy-toth-article-1.440757 [https://perma.cc/NYC7-
2324].   
17 Andrew Carnegie’s apparent generosity should be viewed in historic context. Toth, like 
many Hungarians, worked at Carnegie’s J. Edgar Thomson Steelworks in Pittsburgh.  
Conditions were poor and wages were low. And, the steelworkers were required to work on 
Christmas Day, 1890. When the Hungarians staged a walk out on New Year’s Day, their places 
were taken by Irish workers. A riot ensued when the Hungarian workers marched on the factory.  
An Irish supervisor, Michael Quinn, was killed. A witness was led down a line of Hungarian 
workers, picked out two claimed to have assaulted Quinn, and when he came to Toth, Toth 
laughed at him. The witness then accused Toth of involvement in the assault. Following a trial 
conducted in English, a language that the Hungarian workers did not understand, the three were 
convicted and sentenced to death. Carnegie persuaded the Governor to commute the sentences 
to life imprisonment. In 1910, a dying man in Hungary named Stephen Toth, who fled the 
United States immediately after the riot, admitted that he participated in the murder. Based on 
that confession, the Governor freed Andrew Toth. Id. For more on the Toth/Carnegie case, see 
Rob Warden, Andrew Toth, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATION, 
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetailpre1989.aspx?caseid=334 
[https://perma.cc/T9QV-N7T6]. 
18 S. 7675, 62d Cong., 49 CONG. REC. 356 (1912). 
19 United States v. Keegan, 71 F. Supp. 623, 626–27 (S.D.N.Y. 1947); see also Lawrence 
Bluestone, Unjust Imprisonment Claims Before the Court of Federal Claims: The Presentation 
of a Certificate of Innocence Should Not Be Considered “Jurisdictional,” 21 FED. CIR. B.J. 221, 
223–24 (2011). 
20 EDWIN M. BORCHARD, STATE INDEMNITY FOR ERRORS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, S. DOC. NO. 
62-974 (1912). 
21 Id. at 5. 
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol69/iss2/5
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the public peace, have been unjustly arrested, detained, or convicted and punished.”22 
Borchard’s review of those statutes indicated that compensation in Europe was strictly 
limited to those who “deserve it.”23 But, there was no clear agreement on what that 
meant. 
Borchard found that some countries compensated persons who were arrested, 
detained, and released without having been convicted of a crime.24 Others 
compensated those who were acquitted after trial.25 Still others required an acquittal 
after appeal of a conviction.26 Some, but by no means all, additionally required a 
showing of innocence of the crimes for which they were charged.27 Borchard 
mentioned the approaches of Sweden and Hungary in particular: 
In Hungary and in Sweden in case of unjust detention pending trial [one 
claiming innocence] must show any one of three things: First, in both 
countries, the act for which he is held has not been committed. Second, in 
Hungary, that the accused has not committed it; in Sweden, that its author 
was another than the accused. Third, in Sweden, that from all the 
circumstances it could not have been committed by him; in Hungary, that 
while committed by him it was not in a legal sense a punishable act.28    
Borchard’s proposal, set forth at the end of his report,29 was essentially identical 
to the 1912 bill introduced in the Senate. It was clearly more limited than most of the 
European models he studied, requiring both a wrongful conviction and a showing of 
innocence.30 He adopted language similar to his description of the statutes in Sweden 
and Hungary.31   
The 1912 Senate bill first focused on the standard for showing wrongful conviction 
and framed it in terms of crimes.32 It permitted those who were convicted of a federal 
crime but who, after appeal or retrial, were found “innocent,” of the charged crime 
“and not guilty of any other offense against the United States,” to apply for 
 
22 Id. at 6. 
23 Id. at 14. 
24 Id. at 11–12. 
25 Id. at 15. 
26 Id. at 11–12. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. at 15–16. Borchard found Hungary’s approach interesting; it required compensation for 
those found not guilty after wrongful conviction and permitted compensation for those unjustly 
detained prior to trial who could prove innocence. Id. at 16. 
29 Id. at 31–33. 
30 Id. at 31. 
31 Id. at 32. 
32 S. 7675, 62d Cong., 49 CONG. REC. 356 (1912). 
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“indemnification for the pecuniary injury he has sustained through his erroneous 
conviction and imprisonment.”33 The cap on damages was $5,000.34   
Then, the bill turned to the standard of showing innocence and focused on an 
“act.”35 When proceeding in the Court of Claims, claimants had the burden of proving 
their innocence by “show[ing] that the act with which he was charged was not 
committed at all or, if committed, was not committed by the accused.”36 Last, “the 
claimant must show that he has not, by his acts or failure to act, either intentionally or 
by willful misconduct or negligence, contributed to bring about his arrest or 
conviction.”37   
A parallel House bill was also introduced in 1912 and was virtually identical to the 
Senate version except for one curious difference, substituting an “or” for the italicized 
“and” above.38 The House bill allowed those who were convicted of a charged federal 
crime to seek compensation if they were, after appeal, retrial, or rehearing, “found to 
have been innocent of the crime for which he was charged or of any other offense 
against the United States.”39 Both bills died in committee and no effort to pass a federal 
wrongful conviction compensation statute was made for over twenty years.40 
B. 1935–1938 
The predecessor to today’s federal wrongful conviction compensation statute was 
introduced in the Senate in 1935 by Senator Francis Maloney of Connecticut.41 Senate 
 
33 Id. § 1 (emphasis added). In full, the section read: “That any person who, having been 
convicted of any crime or offense against the United States shall hereafter, on appeal from the 
judgment of conviction or on the retrial or rehearing of his case, be found to have been innocent 
of the crime with which he was charged and not guilty of any other offense against the United 
States . . . may, under the conditions hereinafter mentioned, apply by petition for 
indemnification for the pecuniary injury he has sustained through his erroneous conviction and 
imprisonment.” Id. This “not guilty of any other offense” requirement is written broadly enough 
to require claimants to identify a finding that that they had never committed any federal crime, 
whether or not related to the crime for which they were wrongly convicted. The impossible 
breadth of this requirement was fixed in the bill ultimately passed in 1938.  
34 Id. § 9. 
35 Id. § 4–5. 
36 Id. § 4. 
37 Id. § 5. 
38 H.R. 26748, 62d Cong. § 1 (1912).   
39 Id. (emphasis added). 
40 See Abu-Shawish v. United States, 898 F.3d 726, 734 n.4 (7th Cir. 2018); United States v. 
Keegan, 71 F. Supp. 623, 627 (S.D.N.Y. 1947). That 1912 effort closely coincided with the 
passage of state compensation statutes in Wisconsin, see Act of May 8, 1913, ch. 189, 1913 
Wis. Sess. Laws 196, 196–98, and California, see Act of May 24, 1913, ch. 165, 1913 Cal. Stat. 
245, 245–46; see also Shelley Fite, Compensation for the Unjustly Imprisoned: A Model for 
Reform in Wisconsin, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 1181, 1182 nn.1–4 (2005). 
41 S. 2155, 74th Cong., 79 CONG. REC. 2961 (1935). 
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol69/iss2/5
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Bill 2155 was nearly identical to the Borchard-drafted 1912 Senate bill. It required, in 
Section 1, that the claimant show that after appeal, retrial, or rehearing, he had been 
“found innocent of the crime with which he was charged and not guilty of any other 
offense against the United States.”42 Borchard’s 1912 report explained that the latter 
requirement is “used to cover cases where the indictment may fail on the original 
count, but claimant may yet be guilty of another or a minor offense.43 Therefore, if 
the accused has committed any offense against the United States, his right to relief is 
barred.”44  
The bill contemplated that the claimant would offer testimony and evidence to the 
Court of Claims.45 Like the 1912 bills, the burden was placed in Section 4 on the 
claimant to also prove his innocence, requiring him to “show that the act with which 
he was charged was not committed at all, or, if committed, was not committed by the 
accused.”46 Borchard did not intend this to be easy: “only a most flagrant case of 
injustice could be brought within the terms of this section.”47 The claimant would also 
have to show that “he has not, either intentionally or by willful misconduct or 
negligence, contributed to bring about his arrest or conviction.”48   
Unlike the 1912 bills, incarceration was not required to obtain indemnification,49 
but the maximum amount the claimant could obtain was still only $5,000.50 The only 
apparent rationale for that figure lies in Borchard’s 1912 report: “[t]his provision is to 
limit any exorbitant claims which may be brought.”51 The bill thus combined both 
rigor and parsimony. 
For reasons not made clear from the legislative history, twenty-three years after 
the 1912 bill died, the Senate seemed to do little more than to dust off the 1912 bill, 
report, and rationale, and reintroduce it. No particular cases of wrongful conviction 
 
42 S. 2155 § 1 (emphasis added). In relevant part, section 1 read, “That any person, who, 
having been convicted of any crime or offense against the United States, shall hereafter, on 
appeal from the judgment of conviction or on the retrial or rehearing of his case, be found to 
have been innocent of the crime with which he was charged and not guilty of any other offense 
against the United States . . . may, under the conditions hereinafter mentioned, apply by petition 
for indemnification. . . .” 
43 EDWIN M. BORCHARD, STATE INDEMNITY FOR ERRORS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, S. DOC. NO. 
62-974, at 31 (1912). 
44 Id. 
45 S. 2155 §§ 2, 6. The United States could examine witnesses, have access to all testimony 
taken and “resist all claims presented under this Act by all proper legal defenses.” Id. § 8. 
46 Id. § 4 (emphasis added). 
47 S. DOC. NO. 62-974, at 32. 
48 S. 2155 § 5. 
49 Id. § 1 (allowing indemnification for “pecuniary injury he has sustained through his 
erroneous conviction and/or imprisonment”). 
50 Id. § 9.  
51 S. DOC. NO. 62-974, at 33. 
9Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2021
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subsequent to those of Toth and Adolf Beck, who was wrongly convicted of a theft in 
England in 1896, were cited in the legislative reports to prompt renewed calls for the 
legislation. The only thing which appeared to put wrongful conviction compensation 
again on the legislative docket was the 1932 publication of Professor Borchard’s 
Convicting the Innocent: Sixty-Five Actual Errors of Criminal Justice.52 Essentially 
the National Registry of Exonerations of its time, the book was noted, but only in 
passing, at the conclusion of the 1938 House Report,53 reflecting Professor Borchard’s 
episodic, but persistent, advocacy for his vision of justice. 
In 1936, the Senate Judiciary Committee favorably reported Senate Bill 2155 to 
the Senate with two important amendments recommended by Attorney General 
Homer Cummings.54 The first,  in Section 1, would require the claimant to have been 
found “not guilty,” rather than innocent, of the crime for which he was convicted 
following appeal, retrial, or rehearing.55 The Attorney General stated that the 
amendment was required because there is no such verdict as “innocent.”56 He took 
comfort that this proposed amendment would not open compensation to those not 
“entirely innocent” because Section 4 of the bill still imposed on the claimant the 
burden of showing innocence.57 
The second amendment was that the word “act” in Section 4 be changed to 
“crime.”58 One is charged with crimes, not acts. The Attorney General further agreed 
that compensation was due “in the rare and unusual instances” in which a person was 
found “entirely innocent” in contrast to situations in which convictions were reversed 
“on the ground of insufficiency of proof or . . . whether the facts charged and proven 
constituted [a criminal] offense.”59 He, like Borchard, believed it necessary to 
“separate from the group of persons whose convictions have been reversed those few 
who are in fact innocent of any offense whatever.”60 
The rationale offered for the bill in the resulting Senate Report is thin, resting 
principally on two grounds, neither of which would be terribly persuasive today. First, 
it noted that most European countries compensated the unjustly convicted.61 Second, 
 
52 EDWIN M. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: SIXTY-FIVE ACTUAL ERRORS OF 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1932). At this point in his career, Borchard was a professor at Yale Law 
School. 
53 H.R. REP. NO. 75-2299, at 4 (1938).  
54 S. REP. NO. 74-2339, at 1, 3 (1936). 
55 Id. at 1; S. 2155 § 1. 
56 S. REP. NO. 74-2339, at 3. The Attorney General also expressed “doubt” that wrongly 
convicted persons who served no time in prison should be compensated. Id. 
57 Id.   
58 S. 2155 § 4. 
59 S. REP. NO. 74-2339, at 3. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 1. 
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it quoted two law professors, one being Dean John H. Wigmore of Northwestern Law 
School, who supported the bill and analogized the state’s duty of compensation to 
eminent domain: 
To deprive a man of liberty, put him to heavy expense in defending himself, 
and to cut off his power to earn a living, perhaps also to exact a money fine 
– these are sacrifices which the state imposes on him for the public purpose 
of punishing crime.62 
To the question of why no federal compensation statute had previously been 
passed, Dean Wignore pulled no punches: “Because we have persisted in the self-
deceiving assumption that only guilty persons are convicted. We have been ashamed 
to put into our code of justice any law which per se admits that justice may err. But let 
us be realists.”63 
The 1936 report also excerpted a statement from Professor Borchard’s 1912 Senate 
Report featuring the then old case of Andrew Toth.64 Borchard noted that 
Pennsylvania had no compensation statute (it still doesn’t) and that the Pennsylvania 
legislature refused to compensate him through a private bill.65 Borchard also cited the 
1896 case of Adolf Beck,66 who was incarcerated for seven years in England prior to 
his exoneration and received no compensation.67 Nowhere is mentioned the irony that 
the federal compensation statute advocated by Borchard would not have helped Toth, 
who was convicted in a state court of a state crime. 
Senator Maloney reintroduced the bill, now Senate Bill 750, in January of 1937,68 
with exactly the same language as the 1935 bill but strangely without the sensible 
amendments suggested by Attorney General Cummings. The bill was reported out of 
the Senate Judiciary Committee in March of 1937 without amendment and with a 
Judiciary Committee Report nearly identical to that of 1936.69  
 
62 Id. at 2. 
63 Id. 
64 Id.; see also Abu-Shawish v. United States, 898 F.3d 726, 734 n.4 (7th Cir. 2018) 
(summarizing Toth case and Borchard’s scholarship). 
65 S. REP. NO. 74-2339, at 2. 
66 For more on the Beck case, which involved not violence, but theft, see Brian Cathcart, The 
Strange Case of Adolf Beck, INDEP. (Oct. 17, 2004), 
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/the-strange-case-of-adolf-beck-535209.html. 
67 S. REP. NO. 74-2339, at 2. The cases of Toth and Beck are mentioned in a 1916 Yale Law 
Journal article, James W. Garner, Criminal Procedure in France, 25 YALE L.J. 255, 282 (1916).  
Garner recommends that a French 1895 wrongful conviction compensation statute be replicated 
in the United States and England. Oddly, citing Borchard’s own work, Garner notes that Beck 
in fact received $25,000 from the Parliament. Id. at 282 n.96. 
68 S. 750, 75th Cong., 81 CONG. REC. 220 (1937). The bill was referred to the House Judiciary 
Committee on March 22, 1937. 
69  S. REP. NO. 75-202, at 1,3 (1937). That Report reprinted the suggestions made by Attorney 
General Cummings in 1936, but they were not reflected in the 1937 bill.   
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The Senate bill, then, had two essential prongs.70 The first prong was procedural 
– a requirement that there be a two-fold finding: that the claimant be innocent after 
appeal, retrial, or rehearing and that the claimant be not guilty of any other federal 
offense.71 The second prong was substantive, requiring a showing of innocence in one 
of two ways: that the act with which the claimant was charged was not committed at 
all or, if committed, was not committed by the claimant.72   
So understood, satisfying these requirements was impossible in practice. A finding 
of innocence is rarely the outcome of post-conviction relief.73 A vacatur or reversal of 
conviction or a reversal and grant of a new trial would instead be the typical remedies 
in successful post-conviction litigation.74 Nor, as Attorney General Cummings 
understood, would the successful result of a retrial be a verdict of “innocent.” It would 
be not guilty.   
Moreover, how is the prospective plaintiff to obtain a finding that he or she is not 
guilty of other offenses against the United States? There was no obvious mechanism 
by which the post-conviction court would have occasion to decide the absence of guilt 
of crimes not charged in the indictment. In 1938, the flawed Senate bill was 
extensively redrafted in the House Judiciary Committee,75 and Congress passed the 
House bill.76 The result, however, was not much of an improvement.   
The principal revision was to replace the opportunity to present testimony and 
evidence to the Court of Claims with the ministerial requirement that the claimant 
simply present the Court with a certificate of innocence from the federal court in which 
he or she were convicted.77 The intent, perhaps, was to streamline the process in the 
Court of Claims. But, doing so led to two difficulties.   
First, while the statute prescribed what a certificate of innocence needed to recite, 
it established no burden of proof by which the claimant needed to prove each element 
to the convicting court.78 Nor did it establish any procedures by which the convicting 
 
70 S. 750 § 1, 75th Cong., 81 CONG. REC. 2469–70 (1937). 
71 Id.  
72 Id. § 4. 
73 See Keith A. Findley, Defining Innocence, 74 ALB. L. REV. 1157, 1190 (2010-2011) 
(“Courts almost never rule on the question of actual innocence. The simple story of clear 
innocence is not a story the criminal justice system is designed to accommodate.”). 
74 See John M. Leventhal, A Survey of Federal and State Courts’ Approaches to a 
Constitutional Right of Actual Innocence: Is There a Need for a State Constitutional Right in 
New York in the Aftermath of CPL § 440.10(1)(G-1)?, 76 ALB. L. REV. 1453, 1473 n.258 (2012-
2013) (collecting cases). 
75 Act of May 24, 1938, ch. 266, Pub. L. No. 75-539, 52 Stat. 438 (current version at 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1495, 2513); see also Bluestone, supra note 19, at 224–25. 
76 Act of May 24, 1938, ch. 266, 52 Stat. at 438. 
77 This was said to be in keeping with the then-present practice and procedure of the Court 
of Claims. See H.R. REP. NO. 75-2299 (1938). Unlike the Senate bill, the enacted statute 
required, as a condition for compensation, that the claimant serve time in prison. Id.  
78 Id. at 1–2. 
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court should adjudicate petitions for the required certificate of innocence.79 Those 
were left entirely in the hands of the convicting court.    
Second, by assigning the certificate of innocence the central role in the Court of 
Claims’ compensation process, the drafters felt the need to deal with two additional 
matters – how to define the scope of people entitled to file a petition for compensation 
with the Court of Claims, and how to prescribe the recitals of the certificate that would 
be sufficient to authorize compensation.80 The result was a complicated mess. Section 
1, later codified as 18 U.S.C. § 729, was a dreadfully long sentence: 
That any person who, having been convicted of any crime or offense against 
the United States and having been sentenced to imprisonment and having 
served all or any of part of his sentence, shall hereafter, on appeal or on a 
new trial or rehearing, be found not guilty of the crime of which he was 
convicted or shall hereafter receive a pardon on the ground of innocence, if 
it shall appear that such person did not commit any of the acts with which he 
was charged or that his conduct in connection with such charge did not 
constitute a crime or offense against the United States or any State, Territory, 
or possession of the United States or the District of Columbia, in which the 
offense or acts are alleged to have been committed, and that he has not, either 
intentionally, or by willful misconduct, or negligence, contributed to bring 
about his arrest or conviction, may . . . maintain suit against the United States 
in the Court of Claims for damages . . . .81   
The statute did adopt Attorney General Cummings’ first recommended change 
from “innocent” to “not guilty.”82 That resolved one of the difficulties in the Senate 
version. But it did not accept his second recommendation that “act” be changed to 
“crime.” In fact, it made matters more difficult for plaintiffs in three ways.   
First, believing that the Senate Bill’s two-part requirement that persons be innocent 
“of the crime with which he was charged and not guilty of any other offense against 
the United States” was “not definite and specific enough,”83 it added a requirement 
that it “appear” that the claimant did not commit the “acts” with which he was charged 
without indicating where such a negative finding should appear. Second, the 
unexplained use of the plural word “acts,” found in no prior legislative proposal, 
would seem to require plaintiffs to disprove that they committed each act charged in 
the indictment. That would include cases in which the charged crime required proof 
of multiple acts, some of which might, alone, be entirely innocent behavior. Third, in 
addition to showing that the conduct did not constitute a federal crime, the statute 
 
79 Abu-Shawish v. United States, 898 F.3d 726, 737 (7th Cir. 2018). 
80 H.R. REP. NO. 75-2299, at 2. 
81 Act of May 24, 1938, ch. 266, § 1, 52 Stat. at 438. Note that the narrowing of the “other 
offense” provision to those in connection with the charges for which there was a wrongful 
conviction eliminates the overbreadth problem identified in footnote 33. 
82 Id.; S. REP. NO. 74-2339, at 1 (1936). 
83 H.R. REP. NO. 75-2299, at 2. 
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expanded the provision to include that the conduct not be crimes of any state, territory, 
or the District of Columbia.84 
Although generally tightening the requirements, the statute was recast in one 
unexplained and apparently liberalizing way. The statute used the disjunctive “or” in 
describing the requirements, stating that it be found that the plaintiff did not commit 
any of the charged acts or that the conduct in connection with such charge not 
constitute a federal or state crime.85 In every proposal except the House bill of 1912, 
the conjunctive “and” was used.86  
The statute thus raised the theoretical possibility that someone who committed 
some charged acts, but those acts did not constitute another crime, or that someone 
who committed no charged acts, but whose conduct related to the charged crime 
violated a different crime could be eligible for compensation. The report, however, 
using the conjunctive, insisted that it did not do what it plainly did. It said, “[i]n other 
words, the claimant must be innocent of the particular charge and of any other crime 
or offense that any of his acts might constitute.”87 
In Section 2, later codified as 18 U.S.C. § 730, the only admissible evidence that 
the claimant was permitted to present to demonstrate eligibility for compensation was 
a certificate of innocence issued by the court in which the claimant was convicted, or 
a certified copy of the pardon containing the recitals or findings that: 
(a) Claimant did not commit any of the acts with which he was charged; 
or 
(b) [T]hat his conduct in connection with such charge did not constitute a 
crime or offense against the United States or any State, Territory, or 
possession of the United States or the District of Columbia, in which the 
offense or acts are alleged to have been committed; and  
(c) [T]hat he has not, either intentionally, or by willful misconduct, or 
negligence, contributed to bring about his arrest or conviction.88 
These three recital requirements, notably (a), overlap what was required in Section 
1. But, the placement of “or” at the end of section (a) and “and” at the end of section 
(b) led to confusion. Did the certificate have to recite either (a) or (b), plus (c), or did 
it only have to recite (a) or, alternatively, (b) plus (c)? The court in Keegan v. United 
States89 puzzled over this question, concluding that the former was correct.90 
 
84 Act of May 24, 1938, ch. 266, § 1, 52 Stat. at 438. 
85 Id.  
86 S. 7675, 62d Cong. (1912); H.R. 26748, 62d Cong. (1912); S. 2155, 74th Cong. (1935); 
H.R. REP. NO. 75-2299, at 2 (1938). 
87 H.R. REP. 75-2299, at 2 (emphasis added).  
88 Act of May 24, 1938, ch. 266, § 2, 52 Stat. at 438.  
89 United States v. Keegan, 71 F. Supp. 623, 638 (S.D.N.Y. 1947). 
90 Similarly, the Keegan court parsed through the language of 18 U.S.C. § 729 and found, 
contrary to Hadley v. United States, 101 Ct. Cl. 112 (1944), that the claimant needed to prove 
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In sum, the House started with a Senate bill which was flawed, but fixable. By 
changing the locus of litigation from the Court of Claims to the court of conviction, 
the House wound up narrowing and confusing the statute’s requirements in ways that 
it either did not explain, did not intend, or misstated in the legislative history. The 
result was a statute plagued by fuzzy thinking and language from which it has never 
fully recovered. 
C. 1948 
The reorganization and recodification of Title 28 of the U.S. Code in 1948 resolved 
some ambiguities91 and changed the structure of the compensation statute.92 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1495 vested the Court of Claims with jurisdiction to render judgment on claims by 
those “unjustly convicted of an offense against the United States and imprisoned.”93  
28 U.S.C. § 2513 reorganized the eligibility requirements for compensation by 
combining Sections 729 and 730.94 No longer are there separate statutes which 
identify the requirements a petitioner must meet to qualify to seek federal 
compensation and, if satisfied, set forth the required recitals for a certificate of 
innocence. The purpose of the reorganization was that the statute was “completely 
rewritten in order to clarify ambiguities which made the statute unworkable as enacted 
originally.”95 
 Section 2513(a) and (b) together state what the petitioner must plead and prove to 
obtain compensation, the proof taking the form of a certificate of innocence issued by 
the convicting court:   
(a) Any person suing under section 1495 of this title must allege and prove 
that: 
(1) His conviction has been reversed or set aside on the ground that he is not 
guilty of the offense of which he was convicted, or on new trial or rehearing 
he was found not guilty of such offense, as appears from the record or 
certificate of the court setting aside or reversing such conviction, or that he 
 
that he did not commit the acts for which he was convicted or that those acts did not constitute 
a crime against the United State or other state or territory. Keegan, 71 F. Supp. at 637. 
91 For example, 28 U.S.C. § 2513(a)(1) clarifies the “appears” problem described above by 
referring to the “record or certificate.” The very brief legislative history of the recodification 
says that the statute was “completely rewritten in order to clarify ambiguities which made the 
statute unworkable as enacted originally.” 28 U.S.C. § 2513 (Supp. II 1948) (reviser’s note). 
92 18 U.S.C. §§ 729, 730 were repealed and recodified. See Abu-Shawish v. United States, 
898 F.3d 726, 735 (7th Cir. 2018). 
93 Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, Pub. L. No. 80-773, § 1495, 62 Stat. 869, 941 (codified at 
28 U.S.C. § 1495 (Supp. II 1948)), amended by Court of Federal Claims Technical and 
Procedural Improvements Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-572, § 902(a)(1), 106 Stat. 4506, 4516. 
94 Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 2513, 62 Stat. at 978 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 
2513). 
95 28 U.S.C. § 2513 (Supp. II 1948) (reviser’s note). 
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has been pardoned upon the stated ground of innocence and unjust 
conviction, and 
(2) He did not commit any of the acts charged or his acts, deeds, or omissions 
in connection with such charge constituted no offense against the United 
States, or any State, Territory or the District of Columbia, and he did not by 
misconduct or neglect cause or bring about his own prosecution. 
 (b) Proof of the requisite facts shall be by a certificate of the court or pardon 
wherein such facts are alleged to appear, and other evidence thereof shall not 
be received.96 
The statute retained the $5,000 cap on damages.97 So things remained almost 
entirely unchanged for over fifty years. 
D. 2000–2003 
In 2000, Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont introduced The Innocence Protection 
Act of 2000.98 Section 301 would have amended the $5,000 cap on damages in 28 
U.S.C. § 2513(e). The bill sought to increase the amount of damages that could be 
awarded to a maximum of $50,000 per year of incarceration and a maximum of 
$100,000 per year for those sentenced to death.99 The bill would further have directed 
the court to consider “the circumstances surrounding the unjust conviction . . . 
including any misconduct by officers or employees of the Federal Government,” the 
“length and conditions of the unjust incarceration of the plaintiff,” and “the family 
circumstances, loss of wages, and pain and suffering of the plaintiff” in determining 
the appropriate amount of damages.100   
The compensation piece of the subsequent 2001 Innocence Protection Act bill 
introduced in both the House and Senate was revised. It called for a flat award of 
$50,000 per year of wrongful incarceration and not more than $100,000 per year of 
incarceration on death row.101 The bill eliminated any standards for the court to 
consider in deciding whether to award less than the cap in such cases. Senate Bill 486 
was reintroduced in the Senate in 2002 and offered yet a different compensatory 
 
96 28 U.S.C. § 2513. 
97 28 U.S.C. § 2513(e) (Supp. II 1948). Between 1948 and 2004, Congress passed three 
technical amendments to the statute. See Bluestone, supra note 19, at 225. 
98 S. 2073, 106th Cong. (2000); see also S. 2690, 106th Cong. (2000). 
99 S. 2690 § 301. 
100 Id. A bill proposed in the House included identical language. See Innocence Protection 
Act of 2000, H.R. 4167, 106th Cong. § 301 (2000). 
101 H.R. 912, 107th Cong. § 301 (2001); S. 486, 107th Cong. § 301 (as introduced in the 
Senate, Mar. 7, 2001). 
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metric.102 It proposed $10,000 per year of incarceration without distinguishing 
whether the case involved the death penalty.103   
The report issued by the Senate Judiciary Committee on Senate Bill 486 touched 
on the proposal to increase the $5,000 cap. Describing it as “miserly,” the report 
observed that many state statutes provided for more compensation while conceding 
that most states, at that time, had no compensation statutes for those wrongfully 
convicted in state court.104 It offered brief summaries of the cases of four state 
exonerees who were not compensated for their wrongful convictions.105 It then 
concluded with a description of the legislation’s humanitarian purpose, language never 
cited in subsequent cases: 
Putting one’s life back together after such an experience is difficult enough, 
even with financial support. Without such support, a wrongly convicted 
person might never be able to establish roots that would allow him to 
contribute to society. To help repair the lives that are shattered by wrongful 
convictions, the bill raises the Federal cap on compensation, and urges States 
to follow suit—at least in cases where the wrongly convicted person was 
sentenced to death. The new Federal cap proposed by the bill as reported is 
significantly lower than the cap proposed by the bill as introduced, and 
significantly lower than many Members of the Committee think appropriate. 
It is very least that the Congress should do.106 
The House bill introduced in 2003 returned to caps of $50,000 per year of 
incarceration and $100,000 in death penalty cases.107 The subsequent House Judiciary 
Committee Report does not explain the preference for higher caps, but includes the 
Congressional Budget Office’s estimate that it “does not expect the number of such 
cases or any increase in payments for this purpose to be significant.”108 As ultimately 
passed in 2004 as part of the Justice For All Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2513(e), was amended 
to read: 
The amount of damages awarded shall not exceed $100,000 for each 12-
month period of incarceration for any plaintiff who was unjustly sentenced 
 
102 S. 486, 107th Cong. (as reported in the Senate Oct. 16, 2002). 
103 Id. § 401. 
104 S. REP. NO. 107-315, at 35 (2002). 
105 Id. at 35–37. None of these men would have been eligible for federal statutory 
compensation because they were not wrongfully convicted in federal court. 
106 Id. at 37. The Senate bill also encouraged states to provide compensation to exonerees 
wrongfully convicted and sentenced to death in state capital cases. The minority report 
supported increasing compensation only for those wrongfully convicted in federal capital cases.  
Id. at 50. 
107 H.R. 3214, 108th Cong. § 331 (2013). The parallel Senate bill contained the same 
language as the House bill. See S. 1700, 108th Cong. § 331 (2013). 
108 H.R. REP. NO. 108-321, at 25 (2003). 
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to death and $50,000 for each 12-month period of incarceration for any other 
plaintiff.109  
III. THE DATA 
The National Registry of Exonerations contains the country’s most accurate and 
important listing of exonerations in the United States.110 Widely cited,111 the National 
Registry documents each exoneration since 1989 and identifies the reasons for each 
wrongful conviction. Among many other data points, the National Registry records 
the race and gender of the exoneree, the court in which they were wrongly convicted 
and calculates the amount of time the exoneree was wrongly incarcerated.112 
The National Registry’s definition of “exoneration” is narrow and exacting.  It is 
not enough for someone’s criminal conviction to be reversed or set aside on appeal or 
through a writ of habeas corpus. Instead, the National Registry defines an exoneration 
as follows: 
A person has been exonerated if he or she was convicted of a crime and, 
following a post-conviction re-examination of the evidence in the case, 
was either:  
(1) declared to be factually innocent by a government official or agency 
with the authority to make that declaration; or  
(2) relieved of all the consequences of the criminal conviction by a 
government official or body with the authority to take that action.  
The official action may be:  
(i) a complete pardon by a governor or other competent authority, whether 
or not the pardon is designated as based on innocence;  
(ii) an acquittal of all charges factually related to the crime for which the 
person was originally convicted; or  
(iii) a dismissal of all charges related to the crime for which the person 
was originally convicted, by a court or by a prosecutor with the authority 
to enter that dismissal.  
 
109 28 U.S.C. § 2513(e). 
110 NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, supra note 4; Gutman & Sun, supra note 3, at 703. 
111 See Radley Balko, Opinion, Report: Wrongful Convictions Have Stolen Over 20,000 
Years From Innocent Defendants, WASH. POST (Sept. 10, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/opinions/wp/2018/09/10/report-wrongful-convictions-
have-stolen-at-least-20000-years-from-innocent-defendants/; Emily Barone, The Wrongly 
Convicted, TIME (Mar. 16, 2017), https://time.com/wrongly-convicted/. The Registry was cited 
in Justice Breyer’s dissent from the denial of certiorari in Jordan v. Mississippi, 138 S. Ct. 2567, 
2571 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting), and in his dissent in Glossip v. Gross, 576 U.S. 863, 911 
(2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting). It has been cited in over thirty other federal and state court 
decisions. 
112 NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, supra note 4. 
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The pardon, acquittal, or dismissal must have been the result, at least in 
part, of evidence of innocence that either  
(i) was not presented at the trial at which the person was convicted; or  
(ii) if the person pled guilty, was not known to the defendant and the 
defense attorney, and to the court, at the time the plea was entered.  
The evidence of innocence need not be an explicit basis for the official 
action that exonerated the person. A person who otherwise qualifies has 
not been exonerated if there is unexplained physical evidence of that 
person’s guilt.113 
In short, one qualifies for entry into the National Registry only if one is declared 
factually innocent by an official or agency to make that designation, or if one’s pardon, 
acquittal (following conviction), or dismissal of charges was the result, at least in part, 
of newly discovered evidence of innocence. A reversal of a conviction on grounds of 
insufficiency of evidence alone is not enough to be listed in the Registry.   
I have used the National Registry’s data pertaining to exonerations of individuals 
previously convicted in a state court in prior articles.114 In those articles, I explained 
how I determined whether an exoneree has sought state statutory compensation or 
compensation through a civil rights or state tort suit.115 I also described how I code 
this compensatory activity, and how I define the codes applied.116 I have done much 
the same for those convicted in federal court and subsequently exonerated since 1989.     
As of January 1, 2021, the National Registry of Exonerations lists 118 persons 
exonerated following conviction in a federal tribunal, six of which were convicted in 
a military court.117 Of those remaining 112 exonerees, 67 were incarcerated and 45 
were not.118 Those who were not incarcerated are not entitled to wrongful conviction 
compensation.119 Sixty percent of these federal exonerees were incarcerated, 
compared to 91% of persons convicted in state court and later exonerated.120 The 
reason for this difference lies largely in the nature of the federal crime at issue and the 
exoneree. Of the 112 exonerees, 48 were wrongly convicted of what might loosely be 
defined as a white-collar crime – tax, securities, mail and wire fraud, and government 
 
113 Glossary,  NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, 
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/glossary.aspx [https://perma.cc/2SWY-
TBRE]. 
114 Gutman, supra note 3, at 373 ̶ 74; Gutman & Sun, supra note 3. 
115 Gutman & Sun, supra note 3, at 707–09; Gutman, supra note 3, at 434. 
116 Gutman & Sun, supra note 3, at 711–15. 
117 NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, supra note 4. 
118 Id. 
119 See 28 U.S.C.§ 2513(e).  
120 NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, supra note 4. 
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program frauds of one sort or another.121 Most were freed before and after trial on 
bond.122 
The 112 exonerees collectively were incarcerated for 287.2 years, or an average of 
2.6 years per person.123 That compares to an average of 9.4 years for state 
exonerees.124 Again, that difference can be explained by the high number of federal 
exonerees who are not incarcerated. Sixty federal exonerees spent less than one year 
in prison.125 
The federal wrongful conviction compensation statute makes it clear that, in order 
to obtain compensation, one requires a certificate of innocence issued by the 
convicting court. A review of the federal docket in PACER, LEXIS CourtLink, 
Bloomberg Law, and other databases can reveal whether the exoneree sought a 
certificate of innocence from the federal court in which they were convicted.    
Table 1 provides the compensation statistics for the 67 federal exonerees who were 
incarcerated: 
 
Not filing for federal statutory compensation 48 
Premature cases 12 
Filed for federal statutory compensation 7      
      Denied 5      
      Pending 0 
      Granted 2 
Table 1 
 
Claimants under the federal wrongful conviction compensation statute have six 
years from the date the conviction is vacated to file a complaint with the Court of 
Federal Claims.126 Of the 67 incarcerated federal exonerees, the applicable statute of 
limitations has yet to run with respect to twelve. Thus, they are coded as premature.127  
Of those twelve, only three have been exonerated since 2017, indicating that it is very 
unlikely that the remaining nine will file.   
Of the remaining 55 exonerees, only seven filed for compensation and just two of 




123 Excluding those who serve no time, the average is 10.3 years. Id. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. 
126 28 U.S.C. § 2501 (6-year statute of limitations); see Bolduc v. United States, 248 F. App’x 
162, 164–65 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (unpublished and nonprecedential) (holding that the six-year 
statute of limitations accrues on the date the conviction is vacated, rather than the date of 
issuance of the certificate of innocence). 
127 Table 1 lists them as “premature” and that number is not included in the total of not filing. 
NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, supra note 4. 
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on federal drug charges, received $551,985.65.128 Antonino Jones, who was 
incarcerated for 2.5 years for drug trafficking and carjacking, received $137,397.26.129  
Just over 3% of incarcerated federal exonerees have received federal statutory 
compensation, accounting for just 6.5% of the years lost.130 Of the five denied, two 
claims were dismissed on technical procedural grounds,131 and one was dismissed on 
statute of limitations grounds.132 The two denied on the merits were Michael Holmes 
and Maria Hernandez, whose cases are discussed below.133 
The contrast with those potentially eligible for compensation under a state 
wrongful conviction compensation statute is striking. The following table sets forth 
data pertaining to the 2,100 persons listed in the Registry who were exonerated of state 
crimes after incarceration in states with compensation statutes. Fifteen states lack such 
statutes. In total, 40.5% of incarcerated state exonerees have received state 
compensation, accounting for 48.9% of the years lost.134 
 
Not filing for state statutory compensation 761 (36.2%) 
Premature cases 191 (9.1%) 
Filed for state statutory compensation 1148 (54.7%) 
      Denied 177 (15.4%) 
      Pending 121 (10.5%) 
      Granted 850 (74%) 
Table 2 
IV. THE STATUTE AS APPLIED 
A. Borchard’s Proposal and Its Flaws 
Before examining how the statute has been applied in practice, it is worth 
reimagining Borchard’s conception of the “deserving.” With that understanding, we 
 
128 Settlement agreement on file with author. 
129 Lyons v. United States, 99 Fed. Cl. 552, 553 (2011). 
130 Federal exonerees may, in addition to statutory compensation, seek compensation under 
the Federal Torts Claims Act, federal civil rights theories, including Bivens claims, Bivens v. 
Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 398 (1971), and/or for 
attorney’s fees under the Hyde Amendment, Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 617, 111 Stat. 2440, 2519 
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3006A). My research has revealed that 25 federal exonerees have sought 
compensation under one or more of these theories. Seventeen were unsuccessful; one case 
remains pending and 7 received compensation. Of the seven, one was Stephen Jones. 
131 Carl and Christopher Veltmann’s complaints in the Court of Federal Claims were 
dismissed because they failed to produce certificates of innocence from the court of conviction.  
Veltmann v. United States, 39 Fed. Cl. 426 (1997).  
132 See Bolduc v. United States, 248 F. App’x 162, 164–65 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
133 Except for them, none of the individuals whose cases are discussed below are listed in 
the National Registry. 
134 Data on file with the author. 
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can better assess the extent to which the statute he drafted and its interpretation diverge 
from those original principles.   
One imagines that Borchard approached his effort with a sense of both modernism 
and moderation. He viewed the United States as far behind Europe; neither the federal 
government nor any state had enacted a wrongful conviction compensation statute by 
1912. While many European countries had far more progressive laws on the books, 
Borchard started small, planting a seed to gain support perhaps with a long-term vision 
that with a legislative foot in the door more progressive reform could follow. 
Borchard then had to argue that his aim was not to pay a lot of people who were 
arrested and not convicted of charged crimes, or who were convicted but whose 
convictions were overturned, as some European countries did. The American 
“deserving” instead were a much smaller group of people who suffered a much more 
significant injustice. The Borchard “deserving” had three characteristics: 1) they were 
wrongly convicted, 2) they were innocent, and 3) they were blameless victims of a 
system that produced a bad outcome.135 
We thus see the origins of the timidity of Borchard’s vision in the face of what he 
likely expected to be opposition by protectors of the public fisc. He believed fervently 
in his humanitarian cause and worked tirelessly to document cases of wrongful 
conviction to underscore the moral case for wrongful conviction compensation. But, 
he understood that there would be doubters – those skeptical of even plausible claims 
of wrongful conviction, those concerned about paying people whose convictions were 
set aside on technicalities, and those worried about scammers manipulating the 
scheme to get money.   
Thus, his task, Congress’ task, and the task of all state legislatures considering 
state wrongful conviction compensation statutes has been to strike a delicate balance 
– to narrow the rules of eligibility to appease the doubters, but not so far as to disentitle 
those who truly merited compensation. To accomplish that goal, Borchard made one 
serious mistake that plagues us still.   
How does a plaintiff136 in a case seeking compensation show that they were 
wrongly convicted? For Borchard, it was when an appellate court on appeal or a trial 
jury on retrial said they were innocent.137 This responded to the doubters’ concerns 
about paying people whose convictions were set aside on a procedural technicality.  
Don’t worry, responded Borchard, unlike those whose convictions were reversed on 
procedural grounds who might nevertheless be guilty, these are clearly deserving 
people whose convictions were reversed on grounds of innocence or who were found 
innocent on retrial.138   
 
135 EDWIN M. BORCHARD, EUROPEAN SYSTEMS OF STATE INDEMNITY FOR ERRORS OF 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, S. DOC. NO. 62-974, at 209 (1912). 
136 I use the term plaintiff to describe criminal defendants who seek a certificate of innocence 
in the court of conviction even though that request is technically a part of the criminal docket.  
The courts have regarded such requests as civil in nature. Betts v. United States, 10 F.3d 1278, 
1283 (7th Cir. 1993). 
137 Of course, as discussed, Attorney General Cummings pointed out that Borchard 
erroneously used the word “innocent” instead of “not guilty.” S. REP. NO. 74-2339, at 1 (1936). 
138 This conception makes the separate requirement of a showing of innocence essentially 
duplicative. 
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The House report poorly explained this distinction:  
The claimant cannot be one whose innocence is based on technical or 
procedural grounds, such as lack of sufficient evidence, or a faulty indictment 
– such cases as where the indictment may fail on the original count, but 
claimant may yet be guilty of another or minor offense.139 
Attorney General Cummings’ letter to the Senate Judiciary Committee echoed a 
similar concern about those benefitting from a technicality: 
Ideal justice would seem to require that in the rare and unusual instances in 
which a person who has served the whole or part of a term of imprisonment, 
is later found to be entirely innocent of the crime of which was convicted, 
should receive some redress. On the other hand, reversals in criminal cases 
are more frequently had on the ground of insufficiency of proof or on the 
question as to whether the facts charged and proven constituted an offense 
under some statute. Consequently, it would be necessary to separate from the 
group of persons whose convictions have been reversed, those few who are 
in fact innocent of any offense whatever.140 
The sentence from the House report and Cummings’ letter are the only passages 
in the lengthy legislative history that explain the rationale for the language of the 
statute. In contrast to the Borchard and Wignore focus on the statute’s humanitarian 
purpose, these passages are ones of exclusion. The caselaw almost uniformly cites the 
House Report, the Cummings letter, and/or cases that do in support of limiting 
interpretations of the statute. 141 Rarely is the remedial purpose mentioned. 
Cummings was not wrong. Borchard’s modest conception of the statute does 
require a method for identifying those “few” who are factually innocent. Borchard’s 
proposal, largely adopted by Congress in this respect, fails to do that properly. The 
problem lies in the nature of a wrongful conviction.  As the National Institute of Justice 
explains, “[a] conviction may be classified as wrongful for two reasons: 1) The person 
convicted is factually innocent of the charges. 2) There were procedural errors that 
violated the convicted person's rights.”142 These categories are not always mutually 
exclusive; they can be overlapping.   
However, Congress, worried about compensating all “procedural winners,” 
overlooked the reality that some might also be factually innocent. After all, many Due 
Process violations arise from unconstitutional misconduct either intended to yield a 
 
139 H.R. REP. NO. 75-2299, at 2 (1938). What this passage probably meant was to evince 
concern that those whose convictions are reversed on procedural grounds could be still guilty 
of the charged crime, not a different offense.   
140 S. REP. NO. 75-202, at 3 (1937). 
141 United States v. Racing Servs., 580 F.3d 710, 712–13 (8th Cir. 2009); United States v. 
Graham, 608 F.3d 164, 170 ̶ 71 (4th Cir. 2010); Osborn v. United States, 322 F.2d 835, 840 (5th 
Cir. 1963). 
142 Wrongful Conviction, NAT’L INST. OF JUST., https://nij.ojp.gov/topics/justice-system-
reform/wrongful-convictions [https://perma.cc/LF4Q-XMZP]; Brad Smith et al., How Justice 
System Officials View Wrongful Convictions, 57 CRIME & DELINQ. 663, 664 (2011). 
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wrongful conviction or willfully indifferent to the possibility.143 Adopting language 
close to Borchard’s, Congress required plaintiffs to show that they were found “not 
guilty of the offense of which he was convicted.”144 This language, in Section 
2513(a)(1), seemingly precludes those whose convictions were overturned on Due 
Process-based fair trial grounds undeveloped in 1912, 1938, or 1948 from the 
opportunity to demonstrate their innocence because their convictions were not set 
aside on the ground that they were not guilty. Fearful of compensating all “procedural 
winners,” Congress overcorrected and ensured none were.   
As it turned out, and explained below, Section 2513(a)(1) has proven to be a barrier 
to some claimants, but not as many as one might expect. A combination of generous 
interpretations of the provision in some cases and parties and courts ignoring it entirely 
in others, has allowed some “procedural winners” to argue their innocence under 
Section 2513(a)(2). For almost all of them, however, this luck is short-lived because 
the skepticism of “procedural winners” that underlies the drafting of Section 
2513(a)(1) seeps into the consideration of their innocence under Section 2513(a)(2). 
The House report and Cummings letter make it clear that “procedural winners” are 
a disfavored class. Courts correctly observe that procedural reversal or acquittal on 
retrial are not tantamount to innocence.145 From that accurate premise, some courts 
draw on the legislative history to support a misplaced suspicion that members of this 
disfavored class are not among those who are “truly” or “altogether” innocent and thus 
deserving of compensation.146 This created a formidable burden on these plaintiffs to 
prove innocence – a high bar that is rarely met. 
This burden manifests itself in what I call “room thinking.” Courts say that they 
are applying a preponderance of the evidence standard required to prove innocence, 
but in practice “room thinking” demands that plaintiffs refute all evidence of guilt – 
to clear the room of all doubt of innocence. I cannot prove that the limited scope of 
the statute and narrow interpretations of it explain the extraordinary underutilization 
of it demonstrated in Part III. Many other factors might explain it, but the potential 
correlation is striking, and one Edwin Borchard would surely regard as disappointing. 
B. The Caselaw 
Putting aside those pardoned,147 the statute clearly requires the plaintiff to plead 
and prove three elements: 
 
143 Official misconduct was present in 54.5% of exonerations listed in the National Registry. 
NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, supra note 4. 
144 28 U.S.C. § 2513(a)(1). 
145 Cf. Osborn, 322 F.2d at 841–42 (denying request for certificate of innocence resting 
solely on grounds that the conviction was reversed because the court-martial lacked 
jurisdiction); United States v. Brunner, 200 F.2d 276, 280 (6th Cir. 1952) (“Innocence of the 
petitioner must be affirmatively established and neither a dismissal nor a judgment of not guilty 
on technical grounds is enough.”). 
146 Osborn, 322 F.2d at 840.  
147 I set this narrow category aside for the purpose of this analysis.   
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1. That the conviction was reversed or set aside on the ground that the 
plaintiff was not guilty of the offense or that they were found not guilty 
of such offense after retrial; and 
2. That the plaintiff did commit any of the acts charged or that the acts or 
omissions charged did not constitute an offense against the United States, 
state or territory; and  
3. That the plaintiff did not cause their prosecution by misconduct or 
neglect.148 
The statute limits the plaintiff to only one form of proof of these elements and no 
others: a certificate of innocence issued by the court in which he or she was wrongly 
convicted.149 To obtain federal compensation, the exoneree must obtain a certificate 
of innocence from the convicting court, which must properly set forth the recitals 
required in Section 2513(a), and file it with the Court of Federal Claims.150 If the Court 
finds the certificate to be in proper form, it simply has the ministerial task of entering 
judgment for the plaintiff.151 The Court of Federal Claims has no power to vacate 
wrongful convictions, to issue certificates of innocence, or to review other courts’ 
decisions not to issue one.152 
There are two major areas of litigation in this area: whether the convicting court 
should issue the certificate and, whether, if it fails to do so or does not do so in 
accordance with the requirements of Section 2513, a case filed pursuant to Section 
1495 in the Court of Federal Claims should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction or for 
failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted.153 My focus is on the first. I 
will examine each of these three prongs in detail and show that as to each there is a 
disconnect between the statutory language and either Borchard’s vision or statutory 
intent, or both. 
 
 
148 See United States v. Mills, 773 F.3d 563, 566 (4th Cir. 2014); United States v. Graham, 
608 F.3d 164, 170 ̶ 71 (4th Cir. 2010). 
149 § 2513(b); Abu-Shawish v. United States, 898 F.3d 726, 735 (7th Cir. 2018). 
150 See, e.g., Burgess v. United States, 20 Cl. Ct. 701, 704–05 (1990).   
151 See Roberson v. United States, 124 F. Supp. 857, 863 (Ct. Cl. 1954). Of course, there 
may be disputes about the amount of compensation that should be awarded. See, e.g., Crooker 
v. United States, 828 F.3d 1357, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding that the plaintiff is not entitled 
to compensation for time served that was credited to a subsequent sentence); Lyons v. United 
States, 99 Fed. Cl. 552, 565 (2011) (awarding plaintiff $50,000 per year, the compensatory 
metric in place at the time of the filing of the complaint rather than $5,000 in compensation 
which was in place during the plaintiff’s imprisonment). 
152 See Johnson v. United States, 411 F. App’x 303, 305 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (per curiam); Sykes 
v. United States, 105 Fed. Cl. 231, 234 (2012). 
153 This second issue is discussed in detail in Bluestone, supra note 19, at 241. The author 
concludes that the failure to file a satisfactory certificate of innocence should not be regarded 
as a jurisdictional defect but, instead, as a failure of proof. 
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1. Prong 1 
Section 2513(a) focuses on the process after conviction and is straightforward to 
apply. In what I will call Prong 1(A), the reversal or vacatur of the conviction must be 
on grounds that the plaintiff is not guilty of the offense for which they were convicted.  
Alternatively, regardless of the reasons for the setting aside of the conviction, this 
Section can be satisfied by showing what Prong 1(B) requires – a finding of not guilty 
after retrial. If the plaintiff is not retried, Prong 1(B) is unavailable.   
The difficulty is that reasonably common grounds for a vacatur, such as ineffective 
assistance of counsel, Brady violations, prosecutorial or police misconduct, or the 
reliance on unreliable forensic evidence, are typically not alone enough to satisfy 
Prong 1(A). If a conviction is set aside on any of these grounds, or other procedural 
infirmities,154 it is often because the court has found that the trial was 
unconstitutionally unfair, not because the defendant was not guilty.155     
So understood, Prong 1(A) is a very substantial hurdle potentially affecting a large 
number of exonerees. Of the wrongful convictions listed in the National Registry, one 
or more of these issues was present in a substantial majority of them. It is also one that 
may not be in the minds of criminal defense attorneys pursuing post-conviction 
remedies. Their task is to try to get their clients’ convictions set aside using arguments 
with the greatest likelihood of success. If that is a “technical or procedural” ground, 
so be it. Even if more difficult (at least in some cases) claims of innocence are also 
made, there is surely no guarantee that the appellate court would reach the innocence 
issue if it could reverse on the narrower ground.156 And, if successful on this technical 
ground, the criminal defense attorney is certainly going to press the prosecutor to drop 
the charges. They would hardly welcome a retrial in the hope that, if successful, it 
could possibly lead to federal compensation. Fifty thousand dollars a year is not worth 
that sort of gamble. Prong 1 stands as a potentially powerful explanation for the 
paucity of attempts, much less successful ones, of exonerees to obtain federal 
compensation. 
 
154 See Osborn v. United States, 322 F.2d 835, 842 (5th Cir. 1963) (finding that Prong 1(A) 
was not satisfied in case in which a conviction of murder in court martial charging violation of 
provision in the Uniform Code of Military Justice was set aside because the provision does not 
apply in peace time); Cratty v. United States, 83 F. Supp. 897, 899–900 (S.D. Ohio 1949) 
(denying request for certificate of innocence on Prong 1(A) grounds by plaintiff whose 
conviction was overturned on statute of limitations grounds). 
155 See, e.g., People v. Trulove, No. A130481, 2014 WL 36469, at *1 (Cal. App. 2014) 
(prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance of counsel); Milke v. Ryan, 711 F.3d 998, 
1019 (9th Cir. 2013) (Brady violation); Bunch v. State, 964 N.E.2d 274, 304 (Ind. App. 2012) 
(newly discovered evidence and Brady violation); Tice v. Johnson, 647 F.3d 87, 111 (4th Cir. 
2011) (ineffective assistance of counsel); Gibson v. State, 514 S.E.2d 320, 327 (S.C. 1999) 
(Brady violation); McMillian v. State, 616 So.2d 933, 949 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993) (suppression 
of exculpatory evidence). 
156 Daniel S. Kahn, Presumed Guilty Until Proven Innocent: The Burden of Proof in 
Wrongful Conviction Claims Under State Compensation Statutes, 44 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 123, 
139 (2010). 
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Hernandez v. United States,157 a case featuring a defendant who is listed in the 
National Registry of Exonerations, is a good recent example of the problem. Maria 
Hernandez was convicted of a drug and money laundering conspiracy in which she 
was alleged to have been sent $125,000 by one of the conspirators that was actually 
sent to her sister-in-law, Maria Pena.158 As it happens, the address to which the money 
was sent had two houses – one that Hernandez vacated before the delivery and the 
other owned by Pena.159 Hernandez’s attorney failed to investigate or present 
evidence on the obvious defenses.160 Without evidence of the delivery, all that was 
left was a highly attenuated and circumstantial piece of evidence against her.161 She 
filed for a writ of habeas corpus.162   
The district judge found that Hernandez’ attorney’s ineffective assistance of 
counsel deprived her of a fair trial.163 Applying a standard that she would have to 
show “a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been 
different but for counsel’s unprofessional errors,”164 the district court concluded that 
absent counsel’s errors, there was a probability of acquittal.165 The prosecution then 
dropped the charges.166 
Hernandez petitioned the court for a certificate of innocence.167 The Fifth Circuit 
affirmed the denial of the petition.168 The court reasoned the relief awarded must be 
“on the ground that” or “because” she was not guilty.169 Here, the relief was awarded 
on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel – “procedural grounds.”170 True, 
that procedural ground had a substantive component – whether there was a reasonable 
probability that without errors, the jury would have had reasonable doubt of guilt.171  
 
157 Hernandez v. United States, 888 F.3d 219, 221 (5th Cir. 2018). 
158 Id.  
159 Id.  
160 Id. at 221–22. 
161 Id. at 221. 
162 Id. 
163 Id. at 223. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. at 222. 
166 Id. 
167 Id. 
168 Id. at 224. 
169 Id. at 223. 
170 Id. 
171 Id. at 223 (citations omitted). 
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But that standard was lower than “not guilty,” and thus the certificate of innocence 
was denied.172   
The Hernandez case is one in which there is pretty compelling evidence of factual 
innocence. Yet, she was barred from trying to make that case because she failed Prong 
1(A) and was not retried. Above, I explained the source of this language and how it 
overcorrected the problem it was trying to solve – the worry about compensating those 
whose reversals were based on “technical” or “procedural” grounds.173 Certainly, 
Congress did not want to pay people based solely on a “technical” reversal (or acquittal 
after retrial); that is not innocence.174 But, Cummings’ letter at least hints at the correct 
view that those whose convictions have been reversed on any grounds should  be 
permitted to try to be among those few able to prove that they are “truly innocent.”175  
After all, while reversal on technical or procedural grounds does not prove innocence, 
it does not preclude it either.    
United States v. Lyons, in contrast, involving one of the two federal exonerees to 
be compensated under the statute, skirts the language of the statute and arrives at the 
right result.176 In Lyons, the court dismissed Lyons’ convictions on Brady and Giglio 
grounds after evidence of egregious prosecutorial misconduct came to light.177 The 
court found that Section 2513(a)(1) was satisfied because he was “exonerated as to all 
of the charges against him.”178 The statute says nothing about exoneration; it requires 
the conviction to be set aside on the grounds that Lyons was “not guilty of the offense 
of which he was convicted.”179 Such was not the case for Lyons. His conviction was 
 
172 Id. 
173 H.R. REP. NO. 75-2299, at 2 (1938) (“The claimant cannot be one whose innocence is 
based on technical or procedural grounds . . .”). 
174 Id.; see also Rigsbee v. United States, 204 F.2d 70, 72 (D.C. Cir. 1953); Cratty v. United 
States, 83 F. Supp. 897, 900 (S.D. Ohio 1949). 
175 Indeed, one of the examples of “technical” reversal cited in the legislative history was 
insufficiency of the evidence. H.R. REP. NO. 75-2299, at 2. Yet, some courts have either held 
that such grounds satisfy Prong 1. United States v. Grubbs, 773 F.3d 726, 732 (6th Cir. 2014); 
Pulungan v. United States, 722 F.3d 983, 984 (7th Cir. 2013); see United States v. Gaskins, No. 
1:04-cr-379, 2019 WL 7758898, at *5 (D.D.C. Dec. 13, 2019), or pass by it without mention.  
United States v. Brunner, 200 F.2d 276, 277 (6th Cir. 1952) is an example. In Brunner, a man’s 
conviction for theft of postal property was in large part the result of his wife’s incriminating 
testimony. The conviction was reversed on the ground that her testimony was erroneously 
admitted. Brunner lost his petition for a certificate of innocence because the court used the 
erroneously admitted evidence against him to conclude that he was not factually innocent. Id. 
at 280. He could have been denied on Prong 1 grounds because the reversal of his conviction 
was not on the ground that he was not guilty of theft. Id.; see also United States v. Keegan, 71 
F. Supp. 623, 638 (S.D.N.Y. 1947). 
176 United States v. Lyons, 726 F. Supp. 2d 1359, 1369 (M.D. Fl. 2010). 
177 Id. at 1364. 
178 Id. at 1366. Other charges were dropped by the prosecution. 
179 Id. 
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set aside on “procedural” grounds. Lyons was the beneficiary of a generous 
interpretation of the statute while Hernandez was not. 
2. Prong 2 
Before addressing the substance of the innocence of Prong 2, let’s first examine 
how courts have approached the process of applying Prong 2 to requests for a 
certificate of innocence. A very influential early decision under the 1938 version of 
the statute, United States v. Keegan,180 laid the groundwork. The court correctly 
observed that Section 730 (like its successor statute) “is entirely silent as to what 
procedure a court should follow in determining whether or not a petitioner is entitled 
to a certificate.”181   
In the absence of statutory direction, the court made two initial and sensible 
decisions. First, the petition for a certificate of innocence was reassigned to the judge 
who tried the underlying criminal case.182 Who would know the evidence better than 
the trial judge?183 Second, the court decided not to rest solely on the criminal trial 
record, but instead permitted the parties to present additional facts by affidavit.184   
The absence of legislative guidance leaves the convicting court with substantial 
discretion to craft the procedures for deciding petitions for a certificate of 
innocence.185 That discretion, however, has its limits at least in the Seventh Circuit.  
There, the trial judge should not simply conclude, without consideration of the trial 
record, that a reversal of a conviction or acquittal after retrial is, alone, insufficient to 
 
180 Keegan, 71 F. Supp. 624. 
181 Id. at 637. 
182 Id. 
183 Chad M. Oldfather, Appellate Courts, Historical Facts, and the Civil-Criminal 
Distinction, 57 VAND. L. REV. 437, 448 (2004). This can be a mixed blessing as Keegan found 
out. It is readily apparent in Judge Barksdale’s opinion that he was not happy that the 
convictions in his court of these German sympathizers were overturned. Keegan is well known 
for its extensive examination of the legislative history of the statute. But, it is never criticized 
for the very dubious grounds on which it denied Keegan’s petition. Keegan, 71 F. Supp. at 638–
40 (regarding as dicta to be ignored the Supreme Court’s holding that the defendants were not 
guilty of counseling evasions because the Court directed the acquittal on conspiracy to counsel 
evasion charges even though the acquittal was not based on the law or facts of conspiracy); see 
also Weiss v. United States, 95 F. Supp. 176, 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (Barksdale, J.) (finding the 
same and adding that the defendant in the same German Bund matter had not shown innocence 
because he and co-defendants were “disposed to counsel evasion”). In contrast, the district judge 
who presided over Abu-Shawish’s first criminal trial in 2006 granted his petition for a certificate 
of innocence in 2020. See United States v. Abu-Shawish, Cr. No. 03-CR-211-1, 2020 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 132322 (E.D. Wis. July 27, 2020). 
184 Keegan, 71 F. Supp. at 637–38. Although the judge thought it would rarely be necessary, 
he had no objection to hearing live witnesses if appropriate. 
185 United States v. Mills, 773 F.3d 563, 566 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. 
Graham, 608 F.3d 164, 166 (4th Cir. 2010)); Rigsbee v. United States, 204 F.2d 70, 72 (D.C. 
Cir. 1953). 
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demonstrate factual innocence.186 At a minimum, the parties must be permitted to offer 
new evidence. The court must take a “fresh look” at such evidence and relevant 
portions of the trial record to determine whether the petitioner is factually innocent.187   
Keegan went on to observe that because the statutes effect a waiver of sovereign 
immunity, their terms are to be strictly construed.188 The court did not mention another 
canon: that humanitarian statutes are to be interpreted liberally in accordance with 
their remedial purposes.189 Keegan instead imposed a substantial burden of proof on 
the plaintiff: “[I]t would seem to me obvious that the burden is on the petitioner at 
least to the extent that the court should not grant the certificate unless it is satisfied 
from the record before it that the petitioner is altogether innocent.”190   
Neither Keegan nor the early cases specify the petitioner’s burden of proof. More 
recent cases have held, without analysis, that the petitioner’s burden of showing an 
entitlement to a certificate of innocence is by a preponderance of the evidence, 
consistent with the ordinary burden of proof in civil cases.191 Nonetheless, that burden 
has generally been very difficult to shoulder.192 A court of appeals has only once 
reversed a district court’s denial of a certificate of innocence,193 and two trial court 
awards of certificates of innocence have been reversed on appeal.194  
This is the empirical support for the courts’ reading of the statute as creating a 
“high bar”195 to compensation. There are two sources for this high bar, one imposed 
 
186 Abu-Shawish v. United States, 898 F.3d 726, 736–37 (7th Cir. 2018). But see Rigsbee, 
204 F.2d at 72 (rejecting argument that acquittal after retrial requires issuance of certificate of 
innocence but engaging in no further record review or fact finding). 
187 Abu-Shawish, 898 F.3d at 733 (quoting Betts v. United States, 10 F.3d 1278, 1278 (7th 
Cir. 1992)). The Magistrate Judge in Abu-Shawish subsequently had an evidentiary hearing on 
the petition for a certificate of innocence. Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing, United States v. 
Abu-Shawish, No. 03-cr-00211 (E.D. Wis. Jan.12, 2017), ECF No. 339. 
188 Keegan, 71 F. Supp at 636. 
189 See Burch v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 99-946V, 2010 WL 1676767, at *6 
(Fed. Cl. Apr. 9, 2010) (collecting cases); McLean v. United States, 73 F. Supp. 775, 778 
(D.S.C. 1947) (interpreting federal wrongful conviction compensation statute liberally in 
accordance with its “beneficent purpose” to include convictions by court martial); Osborn v. 
United States, 322 F.2d 835, 839–40 (5th Cir. 1963) (same); United States v. Lyons, 726 F. 
Supp. 2d 1359, 1365 (M.D. Fla. 2010). 
190 Keegan, 71 F. Supp at 636. 
191 Abu-Shawish, 898 F.3d at 739; Holmes v. United States, 898 F.3d 785, 789 (8th Cir. 
2018); United States v. Grubbs, 773 F.3d 726, 733 (6th Cir. 2014); Lyons, 726 F. Supp. 2d at 
1366. 
192 United States v. Graham, 608 F.3d 164, 172 (4th Cir. 2010). 
193 Abu-Shawish, 898 F.3d at 733 n.1. 
194 Pulungan v. United States, 722 F.3d 983, 986 (7th Cir. 2013); United States v. Brunner, 
200 F.2d 276, 280 (6th Cir. 1952). 
195 Abu-Shawish, 898 F.3d at 735 (citing Pulungan, 722 F.3d at 985). 
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by the language of the statute, and one self-imposed. As we have seen in Prong 1 and 
will see again in Prongs 2 and 3, there is unnecessary and/or unintended language in 
the statute which has the effect of potentially precluding some of the “deserving” from 
compensation. Those can be fixed by amendment.   
In Prong 2 there are also discretionary approaches, based in part on an overreading 
of the legislative history, that require a showing beyond that contemplated by the 
preponderance standard, which raise the bar to compensation. These judicially 
imposed limitations can be corrected by reconceiving the manner by which district 
courts use their wide discretion to develop decision and fact-finding procedures.196   
There are three aspects of Prong 2 worthy of closer examination, two of which are 
discussed below and one of which is discussed in Part V in the context of the Abu-
Shawish case. Recall, as discussed further below, that to satisfy Prong 2, plaintiffs 
must show that they “did not commit any of the acts charged” [Prong 2(A)] or that his 
“acts, deeds, or omissions in connection with such charge constituted no offense” 
against the United States, state, territory or the District of Columbia [Prong 2(B)].197   
a. Acts or Crimes? 
What do we want the “deserving” to be innocent of? Borchard used the term “act” 
to describe it: “[H]e must show that the act with which he was charged was not 
committed at all, or, if committed, was not committed by the accused.”198 Attorney 
General Cummings understood what he meant and suggested that the word “crime” 
be used instead.199 One is charged with and conceivably innocent of a crime, not an 
act. 200 As explained above, the Senate included Cummings’ suggestion in Senate Bill 
2155, but then without explanation dropped it in Senate Bill 750.      
The 1938 version introduced for no obvious reason the language that exists today: 
the plaintiff did not “commit any of the acts charged.”201 The use of the words “any” 
and “acts” make it reasonably clear that the plaintiff must demonstrate that he or she 
did not commit each of the acts that constitute the crime, even if some of the acts are 
inherently innocent ones.202 This creates an unnecessary bar for plaintiffs seeking 
federal wrongful conviction compensation.   
The influential Keegan case illustrates why this crime/acts distinction is important.  
The case involved a petition for a certificate of innocence by an attorney for the 
 
196 Id. at 736; Betts v. United States, 10 F.3d 1278, 1286 (7th Cir. 1992); United States v. 
Keegan, 71 F. Supp. 623, 636 (S.D.N.Y. 1947). 
197 28 U.S.C. § 2513(a)(2). 
198 EDWIN M. BORCHARD, EUROPEAN SYSTEMS OF STATE INDEMNITY FOR ERRORS OF 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, S. DOC. NO. 62-974, at 33 (1912). 
199 S. REP. NO. 74-2339, at 1 (1936). 
200 For the court in Mills, that is proof that “acts charged” is not equivalent to “crimes.”  
United States v. Mills, 773 F.3d 563, 570 (4th Cir. 2014). The result was a statute that was “not 
necessarily more generous to a petitioner.” Id. 
201 Act of May 24, 1938, ch. 266, Pub. L. No. 75-539, § 1, 52 Stat. 438, 438 (current version 
at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1495, 2513) (emphasis added). 
202 See Mills, 773 F.3d. at 571. 
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German-American Bund who was found guilty of conspiracy during World War II to 
violate Section 11 of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940.203 The relevant 
provision of Section 11(3) made it a crime to counsel, aid, or abet another “to evade 
registration or service” or to conspire with others to do so.204   
Section 8(i) of the Act expressed the policy of the United States that employment 
vacancies caused by the draft were not to be filled by members of the Communist 
Party or the German-American Bund.205 Regarding that provision to be 
unconstitutionally discriminatory, the Bund issued Command 37 notifying members 
that they must register for the draft, but urging them to refuse military service until 
Section 8(i) was revoked.206 Its purpose was to produce a test case to challenge the 
statute’s constitutionality.207  
After a month-long trial largely featuring evidence regarding the nature of the 
Bund from which the jury was to infer the intent and purpose of the Command, twenty-
four Bund members, including Keegan, were convicted.208 The Supreme Court 
ultimately overturned Keegan’s conviction on grounds of insufficiency of evidence.209   
The Court held that the Bund Command’s exhortation to its members to register 
for the draft, but to refuse to serve if drafted, was not a crime; counseling to evade 
service was.210 It reasoned that “the surest way of rendering oneself incapable of 
evading military service, of slipping away or escaping it, is to register.”211 To overtly 
urge resistance is not to counsel “stealthily and by guile” to evade the law.212   
Noting that the government did not argue that the Bund Command alone violated 
the Act, the Court examined the prosecution’s remaining evidence.213 It parsed 
through various statements made by the defendants and found that they showed, at 
most, that they “were the kind of men who might be inclined to counsel evasion of 
military service,” not that they actually did.214 The Court therefore held that the district 
court erred in denying their motion for acquittal.215 Not surprisingly, Keegan sought a 
 
203 United States v. Keegan, 71 F. Supp. 623, 624 (S.D.N.Y. 1947). 
204 50 U.S.C. § 311(3), (6). 
205 Id. at § 308(i). 
206 Keegan, 71 F. Supp. at 640. 
207 Keegan v. United States, 525 U.S. 478, 485 (1945). 
208 Id. at 480. 
209 Id. at 478. 
210 Id. at 487–88. 
211 Id. at 487. 
212 Id. at 494. 
213 Id. 
214 Id. at 488. 
215 Id. at 495. 
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certificate of innocence from the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New 
York, the court in which he was convicted.216 
The court quickly concluded that Keegan had committed the acts for which he was 
charged.217 That conclusion is surely correct; there was no dispute about what Keegan 
did. Those acts, however, did not constitute a crime. Nonetheless, the statute’s focus 
on acts, rather than crimes, required the denial of his petition.    
United States v. Mills218 further illustrates the point. Mills, who had been 
previously convicted of seven North Carolina state felonies, sold two stolen firearms 
to a pawn shop.219 He was charged and convicted of the federal crime of being a felon 
in the possession of a firearm.220 Following an intervening Fourth Circuit case,221 Mills 
sought a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that, as reinterpreted, he was not a felon 
for purposes of the applicable federal statute because he could not have been 
imprisoned for over a year for any of the seven state crimes.222 The writ was granted.223   
Prong 2(B) was not available to Mills because his possession of the firearms was 
a violation of North Carolina law.224 For Borchard, that alone would be sufficient to 
deny his petition, but since Prong 2(A) and 2(B) are stated in the disjunctive, Mills 
tried to satisfy Prong 2(A).225 That was a tall order. The majority explained that, 
“when an indictment charges more than one act, if a petitioner commits any of the acts 
charged, he is not eligible for a certificate of innocence.”226 
The majority reasoned that the term “acts” was neither equivalent to “crime” nor 
to the elements of the crime.227 A crime consists of elements. Some of those elements 
are acts and some are a matter of one’s status. After the intervening Fourth Circuit’s 
decision, the combination of Mills’ acts (possession) and status (a state felon) which 
were once regarded as a violation of a federal criminal statute no longer were.  
 
216 United States v. Keegan, 71 F. Supp. 623, 624 (S.D.N.Y. 1947). 
217 Id. at 638. The court denied the petition for a certificate of innocence on this and other 
grounds. Id.; see also Weiss v. United States, 95 F. Supp. 176, 179 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (in a case 
brought by another of the German Bund defendants before the same judge deciding Keegan, the 
court held that “the fact is that he did commit all of the acts with which he was charged, upon 
proof whereof, his conviction followed”). 
218 United States v. Mills, 773 F.3d 563, 570 (4th Cir. 2014). 
219 Id. at 565. 
220 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). 
221 See United States v. Simmons, 649 F.3d 237, 249–50 (4th Cir. 2011). 
222 Mills, 773 F.3d at 565. 
223 Id. 
224 Id. at 567. 
225 Id. 
226 Id. 
227 Id. at n.5. 
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Nonetheless, the majority held that he indisputably committed one of the acts charged 
– possession of the firearms.228 It held that “[t]he only plausible reading of § 2513 is 
that possessing a firearm is an ‘act charged’ against Mills.”229 Possession of firearms 
alone is not unlawful, 230 but commission of that lawful act resulted in Mills’ failure 
to satisfy Prong 2(A). 
Because of the unfortunate language of the statute, three groups of people will 
likely be unable to satisfy Prong 2(A) and receive compensation. The first are those 
convicted of crimes which did not actually occur as a matter of fact. There are 
numerous examples of “no crime” cases of this sort in the National Registry,231 such 
as the alleged murder being a suicide, the allegedly shaken baby’s death was really by 
natural cause, the alleged child sexual abuse was made up through improper 
suggestion, or the alleged arson was actually bad electrical wiring. In such cases, acts 
by the defendant which had appeared suspicious, like carrying the baby, knowing and 
being alone with the victim, or having access to the home in which there was a fire, 
have in retrospect an innocent explanation. But, since the plaintiff did these charged 
but innocent acts, they cannot satisfy Prong 2(A).    
Second are those like Mills, convicted of a crime, which ultimately is determined 
not to be a crime as a matter of law. In these cases, a proper interpretation of the 
criminal statute yields a conclusion that those acts which the defendant did do not 
actually constitute a violation of that statute. An example would arise from errors in 
jury instructions that too broadly interpret the criminal statute.232 Another might be 
cases in which the acts are legally justified, like self-defense.233 The acts were 
committed, but they do not amount to a crime as a matter of law.    
Third are cases in which a conviction is reversed on the ground of insufficiency of 
evidence. An example would be a plaintiff like Keegan who did the acts charged but 
which no reasonable juror could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt constitute a 
violation of a criminal statute.234 A plaintiff might do everything the government said 
he did, but those acts alone are not enough to prove a crime.  
 
228 Id. at 567. 
229 Id. at 569. 
230 Possession of firearms as a state felon, however, is unlawful. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-
415.1(a) (2011). 
231 As of January 1, 2021, 998 of the 2,706 exonerations in the Registry are “no crime” cases. 
232 See, e.g., United States v. McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2361 (2016) (reversing conviction 
based on overly broad jury instruction defining “official act”); Skilling v. United States, 561 
U.S. 358, 367 (2010) (reversing conviction based on overly broad jury instruction defining 
“honest services”). 
233 Rigsbee v. United States, 204 F.2d 70, 72–73 (D.C. Cir. 1953); see also Marie v. State, 
922 N.W.2d 733, 738 (Neb. 2019) (holding that claim of self-defense is insufficient to 
demonstrate actual innocence under Nebraska Claims for Wrongful Conviction and 
Compensation Act). But see Mills, 773 F.3d at 569 (noting that mens rea can be separated from 
“acts charged”). 
234 House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 555 (2006); Speight v. United States, 599 A.2d 794, 798 
(D.C. 1991). 
34https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol69/iss2/5
2021]      ARE FEDERAL EXONEREES PAID?  253 
 One court has resisted this reading of the statute: the Seventh Circuit in Betts v. 
United States,235 the only case reversing the denial of a certificate of innocence. In 
Betts, an attorney was convicted of criminal contempt for failing to attend a court 
hearing. Criminal contempt requires “a willful failure to comply with a lawful order 
of reasonable specificity.”236 The Seventh Circuit reversed Betts’ conviction on the 
ground that the order that he appear in court was not sufficiently clear.237 Thus, it 
could not have been willfully violated.238 As the court explained, “Betts’ conduct, 
quite simply, did not constitute a crime; he is, as the district court put it, ‘factually 
innocent.’”239   
Betts, though, clearly committed the acts (or omissions) that were charged.  
Presumably, among the acts or omissions charged were that he received notice of the 
order to appear in court and failed to show up to the hearing.240 Betts committed those 
acts charged. So did Keegan and Mills. As a result, Betts should fail the Keegan test.  
However, the Betts court interpreted the statute the way Cummings had wished it were 
written – by imagining that the statute’s use of the term “acts” really meant “crime.”  
The court flatly said so by concluding that Betts’ conduct did not constitute a crime.241  
The result in Betts is the right one, and consistent with Borchard’s vision, and 
Cummings’ preference, but not the one directed by the statute. 
That is not to say that plaintiffs found to have committed no federal crime would 
always satisfy Prong 2(A) if it used the word “crime.” Doing so would be substantially 
easier in category two cases, above, like those of Mills and Betts, because a finding of 
innocence turns on a conclusion of law. As discussed below, for “no crime” or 
insufficiency of evidence cases, categories one and three, the task may be more 
difficult, but not impossible. The plaintiff would need to advance some evidence of 
innocence and persuade the judge that it is more likely than not that he or she did not 
commit the crime. To that issue we turn next.     
b. Preponderance or Room? 
As noted, in the absence of statutory direction, courts of conviction have broad 
discretion to determine how to make the Prong 2 judgment.242 A key element of that 
 
235 Betts v. United States, 10 F.3d 1278, 1286 (7th Cir. 1993). 
236 In re Betts, 927 F.2d 983, 986 (7th Cir. 1991). 
237 Id. at 987. 
238 Id. 
239 Betts, 10 F.3d at 1284. In this sense, Betts is a variation of the second category of cases 
described above where it is a court order, rather than a statute, that is interpreted. 
240 In re Betts, 927 F.2d at 987. 
241 Id. The court’s failure to squarely address Prong 2(A) is illustrated in its holding in which 
it quoted Prong 1 and Prong 2(B), but not Prong 2(A). Betts, 10 F.3d at 1284. Perhaps the court 
implicitly decided the case on Prong 2(A) grounds, reading Prongs 2(A) and 2(B) as disjunctive 
requirements. The court, however, did not say that and used language to suggest that it 
considered both prongs and found both satisfied. Id. 
242 Abu-Shawish v. United States, 898 F.3d 726, 736–37 (7th Cir. 2018). 
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procedure is the plaintiff’s burden of proof. Recent cases have held that the plaintiff 
must prove innocence by a preponderance of the evidence.243    
How have courts operationalized this standard? The easy cases are ones in which 
the plaintiff relies solely on a reversal or acquittal and offers no evidence of 
innocence.244 Plaintiffs should lose those cases. For the harder cases in which the 
record contains some evidence of innocence, many courts have asked whether the facts 
in the record nevertheless “leave[] room for the possibility that the petitioner in fact 
committed the offense with which he was charged.”245   
Betts, the only case reversing the denial of a certificate of innocence, is responsible 
for this unfortunate “room” language. The Seventh Circuit tried to show why Betts’ 
situation was different than the “technical” reversals of convictions unrelated to 
innocence. It listed many examples of reversals or vacaturs for reasons unrelated to 
innocence246 – lack of jurisdiction (Osborn), expiration of the statute of limitations 
(Cratty), use of inadmissible evidence (Brunner), or failure of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt (Keegan).247   
In such cases, the ground of the reversal left “room” for the possibility that the 
plaintiff actually committed the crime. This was the point that the House report 
inartfully tried to make.248 And, this was the reason why Congress unwisely drafted 
Prong 1 in such a way that could bar the plaintiff from seeking to demonstrate 
innocence in Prong 2. In contrast, having misinterpreted the statute to require 
innocence of a crime, rather than acts as explained above, the Betts court held that 
there was no “room” because “[c]ontempt . . . was legally impossible.”249   
This logic helped Betts but left other cases out to dry. Prong 2(A) does not require 
that guilt be legally impossible. But, when the notion of “room” for guilt is combined 
with the passages of legislative history that require the plaintiff to be “truly innocent” 
or “altogether innocent,” the burden placed on plaintiffs to demonstrate innocence 
 
243 See supra notes 143–47 and accompanying text. Some state compensation statutes 
employ a clear and convincing evidence standard. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-65-101 
(2018); LA. STAT. ANN. § 15:572.8 (2018); OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, § 154 (2020). 
244 Rigsbee v. United States, 204 F.2d 70, 72 (D.C. Cir. 1953); Osborn v. United States, 322 
F.2d 835, 842 (5th Cir. 1963); United States v. Abreu, No. 11-20100-CR, 2018 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 229911, at *16 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 18, 2018), aff’d, 976 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2020). 
245 Betts v. United States, 10 F.3d 1278, 1284 (7th Cir. 1993); United States v. Grubbs, 773 
F.3d 726, 733 (6th Cir. 2014); see also DeWitt v. District of Columbia, 43 A.3d 291, 299 (D.C. 
2012). 
246 Because these cases involved reversals on grounds other than a finding that the defendant 
was not guilty of the crime he was convicted, these cases should not have gotten past the Prong 
1 stage. 
247 The parenthetical examples are mine, not the court’s. 
248 H.R. REP. NO. 75–2299, at 2 (1938). 
249 Pulungan v. United States, 722 F.3d 983, 985 (7th Cir. 2013). 
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often becomes insurmountable.250 In practice, it is far greater than the preponderance 
of evidence standard.     
One good test for this idea is in insufficiency of evidence cases. Even though the 
legislative history regards these cases as examples of the kind of “technical” or 
“procedural” reversals that should fail Prong 1, these cases have sometimes been held 
to satisfy Prong 1.251 Thus, these insufficiency of evidence cases require a Prong 2(A) 
analysis and test how that prong is applied to situations in which there is some 
evidence or “room” for guilt, but not enough to convict.   
United States v. Grubbs252 offers an example. In Grubbs, police searched Mae 
Grubbs’ house as part of an investigation into stolen vehicles.253 Mae’s son Paul lived 
with her in the house, and her other son Ernest only visited on occasion, including the 
night before the search.254 During the search, police found a nine-millimeter handgun 
in Paul’s bed.255 Paul admitted that it was his gun that he bought at a flea market.256 
Mae testified that Ernest slept in a different room, and Ernest’s fingerprints were not 
found on the weapon.257 Ernest, though, was convicted of being a felon in possession 
of a handgun.258 The conviction was later overturned for lack of sufficient evidence.259  
Ernest then petitioned for a certificate of innocence. What tied the gun to Ernest? 
A neighbor, Jones, testified that sometime previously Ernest encountered him at 
night as he was driving home. Apparently, Ernest accused Jones of having an affair 
with Ernest’s sister. Jones and later Jones’ wife saw that Ernest had a dark colored 
automatic handgun. However, neither of them could testify that it was the gun 
retrieved from Paul’s bed.260   
Is there “room” to conclude that the gun was Ernest’s? Sure. Jones and his wife 
saw Ernest with a gun bearing some characteristics in common with the seized 
weapon. But, is it more likely than not that it was not Ernest’s gun? In overturning his 
conviction, the Sixth Circuit explained: 
 
250 See, e.g., United States v. Racing Servs., 580 F.3d 710, 713 (8th Cir. 2009). 
251 United States v. Grubbs, 773 F.3d 726, 732 (6th Cir. 2014); Osborn v. United States, 322 
F.2d 835, 840 (5th Cir. 1963); United States v. Valle, 467 F. Supp. 3d 194, 202 (S.D.N.Y. 
2020). In other insufficiency cases, the analysis skips Prong 1. Racing Servs., 580 F.3d at 
714; Holmes v. United States, 898 F.3d 785, 790 (8th Cir. 2018).  
252 Grubbs, 773 F.3d at 726.  
253 Id. at 728.  
254 United States v. Grubbs, 506 F.3d 434, 436 (6th Cir. 2014).  
255 Id. at 437.  
256 Id.   
257 Id.   
258 Id. at 436. 
259 Id.   
260 United States v. Grubbs, 773 F.3d 726, 729–30 (6th Cir. 2014); United States v. Grubbs, 
506 F.3d 434, 437 (6th Cir. 2014).  
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At best, this testimony suggests that Grubbs possessed a black, 
semiautomatic firearm at some point before the arrest. It is a tenuous leap . . 
. to infer from Grubbs’s earlier possession that he constructively possessed 
the same black, semi-automatic gun recovered from his brother’s bedroom at 
the time of the arrest. Although it is true that the recovered firearm matched 
Jones’s generic description, these attributes are too common to support a 
conviction for constructive possession.261 
The court further observed that there was no temporal connection between Jones’ 
glimpse of the gun and its seizure.262 
Moreover, this is not a case in which the plaintiff relied solely on the lack of 
persuasive evidence of guilt. He also offered exculpatory evidence – the gun was in 
Paul’s bed, Paul admitted owning it, and Paul testified that he was with Ernest during 
the conversation with Jones and had not seen a gun.263 Perhaps Paul was covering for 
his brother, but there was apparently no evidence introduced to challenge his 
credibility.264 
Nevertheless, the Sixth Circuit upheld the trial court’s denial of the certificate of 
innocence.265 It found persuasive that Jones’ wife saw Ernest with a gun and that Jones 
saw a similar gun not long before the search.266 The court said that it was applying the 
preponderance of the evidence standard, but when weighing the evidence for and 
against the gun being Ernest’s, it is very hard to conclude that the balance weighs in 
favor of the government.267   
Because Ernest could not definitively prove a negative – that the gun was not his 
– there was “room” for the conclusion that it was. Thus, it is easy for “room thinking” 
courts to conclude that the plaintiff has failed to demonstrate they are “truly” or 
“altogether” innocent. But as Professor Keith Findlay explains, “to demand certainty 
is to demand the impossible.”268 Our modern conception of innocence, if anything, is 
more demanding now in a DNA world than it was in Borchard’s a century ago.269   
One wonders whether this heavy burden of showing innocence is really what 
Borchard had in mind. Recall that Borchard’s model innocent man was Andrew Toth.  
How was he so sure that Toth was innocent? The evidence that led to his release was 
 
261 Grubbs, 506 F.3d at 441.   
262 Id. at 442.  
263 Grubbs, 773 F.3d at 733.  
264 Grubbs, 506 F.3d at 437–39.   
265 Grubbs, 773 F.3d at 734.  
266 Id. at 733–34.  
267 Id. at 733.  
268 Findley, supra note 73, at 1162. 
269 Id. at 1188–89 (arguing that DNA evidence can mislead courts into thinking that it now 
serves as the only conclusive evidence of innocence). 
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the death bed confession of the actual killer.270 Isn’t there “room” to think that the 
confession might be fabricated?271 
Ultimately, weighing the evidence in these “room” cases and determining whether 
the plaintiff has shown innocence by a preponderance of the evidence is, in close cases, 
a sensitive and difficult judicial exercise. For example, in United States v. Holmes, the 
plaintiff and a police officer offered competing narratives and the officer’s credibility 
had not been challenged. A district judge was then found to have the discretion to 
“credit either witness and to interpret the evidence either way.”272 Thus did the court 
of appeals affirm the denial of a certificate of innocence of Michael Holmes, who is 
listed on the National Registry of Exonerations. 
When a court must weigh credibility in such close cases, it could rationally decide 
for or against awarding a certificate of innocence. But, a “room thinking” court could 
never do so because there would always be room to find the officer more credible than 
the criminal defendant. That logic is inconsistent with the preponderance of evidence 
standard. That standard does not require the plaintiff to rebut or clear the room of every 
inculpatory fact. It instead requires him to demonstrate that it is more likely than not 
that he did not commit the crime. That contemplates the possibility that there is 
evidence consistent with guilt, but that other facts outweigh them. 
The problem with “room thinking” is that it trains the court’s focus on evidence of 
guilt and essentially presumes it in a way that effectively imposes a burden more 
rigorous than that contemplated by the preponderance standard. There is no obvious 
way to amend the statute to solve this problem. A possible solution, however, resides 
in the recognition that courts have wide discretion to decide petitions for certificates 
of innocence. An appropriate way to exercise that discretion while still remaining true 
to the preponderance standard is to borrow the concept of burden shifting from Title 
VII cases. 
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green273 the Supreme Court developed a 
procedure to implement the plaintiff’s burden of persuasion in Title VII employment 
discrimination cases.274 The plaintiff has the initial burden of showing by a 
 
270 NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, supra note 4. 
271 Dying declarations are admissible in court as an exception to the hearsay rule. FED. R. 
EVID. 804(b)(2). They are allowed because they are considered necessary and reliable. 
See Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the Acceptability of 
Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1357, 1374 (1985). However, dying declarations have been 
questioned as unreliable since as early as 1877. Aviva Orenstein, Her Last Words: Dying 
Declarations and Modern Confrontation Jurisprudence, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1411, 1425 
(2010) (reviewing critique of dying declarations). 
272 Holmes v. United States, 898 F.3d 785, 790 (8th Cir. 2018); see Finley v. United States, 
No. 07-cv-01939, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107006, at *27–28 (E.D. Cal. June 26, 2008) (finding 
that petitioner had not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that he did not have a willful 
state of mind with respect to a fraud). 
273 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).  
274 This has been replicated in other contexts as well. See Babb v. Wilkie, 140 S. Ct. 1168, 
1171 (2020) (discrimination under ADEA’s federal sector provision); Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 
138 S. Ct. 2274, 2284 (2018) (explaining burden shifting in antitrust case); Morris v. Mathews, 
106 S. Ct. 1032, 1038 (1986) (explaining burden shifting in double jeopardy cases); Metro. 
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preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of discrimination.275 This burden is 
“not onerous,”276 but serves to “eliminate any non-discriminatory reasons” for the 
action against the plaintiff.277 Put another way, the plaintiff must show that the act was 
“more likely than not” due to discrimination.278 Satisfying it creates a presumption 
that unlawful intentional discrimination has occurred.279 Given that presumption, if 
the defendant fails to respond, the plaintiff prevails.280    
Satisfying the prima facie case shifts the burden of production to the defendant to 
set forth a non-discriminatory rationale for the employment decision.281 Because that 
burden is of production, not persuasion, the defendant’s rationale need not be 
demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence.282 If the defendant has satisfied its 
burden of production by meeting the prima facie case with sufficient clarity so that the 
plaintiff can respond in full,283 the presumption of discrimination disappears.284   
The burden of production then shifts back to the plaintiff.285 The plaintiff is 
provided a full and fair opportunity to shoulder its burden of showing by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the articulated rationale is actually a pretext for 
unlawful discrimination.286 The plaintiff now must persuade the court either that “a 
discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or . . . the employer's 
proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.”287 Facts underlying the prima facie 
case and inferences from those facts can be used at this stage.288 
In this context, courts can operationalize this burden shifting paradigm by 
imposing on plaintiffs the initial burden of setting forth a prima facie case of 
 
Stevedore Co. v. Rambo, 521 U.S. 121, 138–39 (1997) (explaining burden shifting in workers’ 
compensation act claim). 
275 McDonnell Douglass Corp., 411 U.S. at 802.  
276 Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affs. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).  
277 Id. at 254. 
278 Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978). 
279 Id.   
280 Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254.  
281 Id.  
282 Id. at 256–58.  
283 Id. at 255.  
284 Id. at 253; Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000). 
285 Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256. 
286 Id. at 255–56. 
287 Id. (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 807 (1973)). 
288 Reeves, 530 U.S. at 143.  
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innocence. The plaintiff may not rely solely on the reversal or acquittal.289 Nor would 
it be sufficient simply to identify pre-existing or newly discovered weaknesses in the 
government’s case, such as the recantation of witness testimony. Rather, the plaintiff 
would be required to advance some affirmative evidence of factual innocence.   
If the plaintiff is able to do so, the burden of production would then shift to the 
government to refute that prima facie case by seeking to undercut the evidence of 
innocence, to set forth existing or new evidence of guilt, or both. If the court concludes 
that the evidence of innocence outweighs the evidence of guilt, it should issue the 
certificate. If it is unconvinced, the burden of production shifts back to the plaintiff to 
attempt to rebut the government’s evidence of guilt and/or its arguments casting doubt 
on the evidence of innocence.   
The burden of persuasion remains on the plaintiff throughout. The burden shifting 
concept expands the court’s narrow focus on the remaining evidence of guilt and 
whether the plaintiff can entirely explain it in a way that convinces the court that he 
or she is altogether or truly innocent. The court’s attention returns to evaluating 
whether plaintiff has established that it is more likely than not that they are innocent.     
United States v. Herrera290 is an example of a case which could result in a different 
outcome if burden shifting replaced room thinking. Herrera was tried and convicted 
on two counts of bank robbery.291 Surveillance video showed a Hispanic man with 
glasses and a Red Sox cap handing a teller a robbery note.292 As the video was 
publicized, several people, including a jailer, Herrera’s cousin, and three tellers 
recognized the man as Herrera and so testified.293 
After Herrera was convicted and incarcerated, there was a very similar third Texas 
bank robbery involving a Hispanic male with glasses and a different cap.294 A woman 
called Crime Stoppers and said she had information that one of the earlier robberies 
was committed by her boyfriend and his cousin, neither of whom were Herrera.295  
Herrera filed a motion for a new trial and at a subsequent evidentiary hearing, 
Herrera’s cousin withdrew her positive identification and the three tellers identified 
the robber as someone much smaller than Herrera.296 The judge granted the motion 
 
289 Osborn v. United States, 322 F.2d 835, 842 (5th Cir. 1963); United States v. Abreu, No. 
11-20100-CR, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 229911, at *16 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 18, 2018), aff’d, 976 F.3d 
1263 (11th Cir. 2020).  
290 United States v. Herrera, No. 10-CR-093, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167265 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 
5, 2016). 
291 Id. at *1.  
292 Id. at *1–2. 
293 Id. at *2.  
294 Id. at *3.  
295 Id. 
296 Id. at *4.  
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for a new trial, finding that Herrera would “probably” be innocent in light of the new 
evidence, and he was not retried.297  
Herrera petitioned for a certificate of innocence.298 The judge denied the petition, 
using “room thinking.”299 The court properly reviewed the newly discovered 
evidence.300 But, the judge concluded that the evidence did not exclude Herrera as the 
robber.301 The court imposed on Herrera the burden of refuting all inculpatory 
evidence and his failure to do so left the “room” necessary to deny the petition.302 The 
court concluded that the “new physical evidence and testimony do not definitely 
exclude Herrera, and there is still substantial evidence that implicates him as the 
perpetrator.”303 The judge focused entirely on the “room,” and said there was 
substantial evidence in it rather than remaining true to the preponderance standard.304     
A burden shifting approach would require the court to look at the evidence from 
different perspectives, rather than training its sights single-mindedly on demanding 
that the plaintiff dispel all doubt of innocence. Herrera would need to first make a 
prima facie case of innocence. Here, this would include evidence from the robber’s 
boyfriend that he confessed to the crime. If that evidence is credible and reliable, the 
burden would shift to the government to offer evidence of guilt. The focus of attention 
and burden are now where they belong. What evidence of guilt remains? How 
credible, reliable, and persuasive is that evidence?   
If the evidence is sufficient to overcome the plaintiff’s evidence of innocence, the 
burden of production shifts to Herrera to counter the evidence of guilt. The court’s 
ultimate task is not to determine whether Herrera has sufficient evidence to 
“definitely” exclude him, but whether, on balance, the evidence of innocence 
outweighs the evidence of guilt. “Room thinking” precludes evidence balancing. To 
 
297 Id.   
298 Id. at *5.  
299 Id. at *8.  
300 Id.  
301 Id. at *10 (the photo of the robber in the third robbery was “ambiguous” and did not 
“definitely depict” the person in the first two); id. at *11 (testimony of Herrera’s cousin and the 
robber’s girlfriend does not “prove[] Herrera’s innocence); id. at *13 (discrepancy in physical 
descriptions do not “definitively exclude” Herrera). 
302 Id. at *14. 
303 Id. at *15; see also United States v. Abreu, No. 11-20100-CR, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
229911, at *14 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 18, 2018) (“there is still room for the possibility that Defendant 
committed the crime”), aff’d, 976 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2020).  
304 A similar case is United States v. Gaskins, 04-CR-379, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 226175 
(D.D.C. Dec. 13, 2019). Gaskins was convicted of drug conspiracy charges. On appeal, the D.C. 
Circuit held not merely that the evidence of guilt was insufficient, but that there was “no 
affirmative evidence that Gaskins knowingly joined the narcotics conspiracy or had the specific 
intent to further its aims.” United States v. Gaskins, 690 F.3d 569, 577 (D.C. Cir. 2012). The 
District Court nevertheless denied the petition for a certificate of innocence holding that it was 
more likely than not that “Gaskins knew of the conspiracy and participated in it anyway.” 
Gaskins, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 226175, at *10.  
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be sure, it is possible that the court would come to the same conclusion, but it would 
approach the question in the way commanded by the statute and by being faithful to 
the preponderance standard. 
I do not suggest that all courts are guilty of “room thinking.” Take the example of 
Stephen Jones, one of the two men listed on the National Registry who were granted 
federal certificates of innocence.305 A jury convicted Jones of possessing cocaine with 
an intent to distribute and he was sentenced to twenty years in prison.306 He later 
moved to vacate his conviction on the ground that it rested largely on the testimony of 
a police officer, Carr, who testified that he saw Jones with a bag of cocaine.307 Well 
after the trial, Carr pled guilty to five felony counts relating to corruption in the course 
of his duties as an officer.308 The United States joined the motion, and Jones’ 
judgment of conviction was vacated.309 
Police obtained a search warrant to search Jones’ parents’ apartment based on 
Carr’s affidavit that an informant told him that someone other than Jones was selling 
cocaine from the apartment.310 When Carr did the search, he claimed to have seen 
Jones there with cocaine.311 Jones had shown that he did not live in the apartment and, 
without the officer’s testimony, there was no evidence that Jones possessed cocaine.312  
The court held that:  
While reversal of a conviction based on the insufficiency of the prosecution’s 
evidence is not enough to entitle a movant to a certificate of innocence, that 
is not the case here. When the non-credible evidence is stripped away, all that 
remains is the evidence of Jones’ presence at the apartment. That act, 
however, was not a crime.313 
“Room thinking” might lead a court to focus on the evidence of guilt from Carr 
and to conclude that just because Carr was corrupt in his work on other cases, it does 
not mean that he was lying in this case. His lack of credibility may justify setting aside 
the conviction, but if Jones had the burden to clear the room of evidence of guilt, that 
 
305 The opinion granting the petition for the other, Antonino Lyons, is United States v. Lyons, 
726 F. Supp. 2d 1359 (M.D. Fla. 2010). 
306 Maurice Possley, Stephen Jones, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, 
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3849 
[https://perma.cc/UZ5J-ENJZ] (last updated Aug. 2, 2019).  
307 Id. 
308 Jones v. United States, No. 10-CV-1748, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51029, at *3–5 (E.D. 
Mo. May 12, 2011).  
309 Id.  
310 Id. at *4–5. 
311 Id. at *3.  
312 Id. at *5.  
313 Id. (citation omitted). As discussed above, if the court had regarded Jones’ presence at 
the apartment as an “act” for purposes of Prong 2(A), the petition would have been denied. 
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would require an admission from Carr that he had lied. Jones, instead, is an example 
of unstated burden shifting. Jones offered evidence of innocence – that he did not live 
in the apartment and so any cocaine there was not his. Indeed, police suspected that 
another person was dealing drugs there.314 The burden of production then shifted to 
the government to provide some credible and reliable evidence of guilt, and it could 
not do so.315    
3.  Prong 3 
Prong 3 places the burden on the plaintiff to demonstrate that “he did not by 
misconduct or neglect cause or bring about his own prosecution.”316 It contemplates 
that there are situations in which a wrongly convicted person who is undeniably 
innocent of the acts charged or other offenses should nevertheless be denied 
compensation. Prong 3 raises two important interpretive questions. First, what is the 
nature of that disqualifying behavior? Second, what is the required causal connection 
between it and the prosecution? 
Unlike the other prongs, the 1938 statute used precisely the same language 
Borchard drafted in 1912: “he has not either intentionally, or by willful misconduct, 
or negligence, contributed to bring about his arrest or conviction.”317 For reasons not 
stated in the legislative history, the 1948 recodification arguably narrows the bar by 
using the term “cause” rather than “contribute,” and “prosecution” rather than “arrest 
or conviction.”    
In Borchard’s survey of the European approaches to wrongful conviction 
compensation, he noted that:  
The statutes of some of the countries, such as Germany, Hungary, Norway, 
and Sweden, specifically mention certain limitations in cases where the 
detention or conviction may be said to have been due to the act of the claimant 
himself – thus, for example, where there has been an attempt to flee, a false 
confession, the removal of evidence, or an attempt to induce a witness or an 
expert to give false testimony or opinion, or an analogous attempt to suppress 
such testimony or opinion.318   
 
314 Id.  
315 United States v. Lyons, 726 F. Supp. 2d 1359 (M.D. Fla. 2010), the only other case 
involving a successful claim for compensation under the federal statute, involved the same kind 
of analysis. In Lyons, the government relied on evidence of Lyons’ being a drug dealer to 
support its case that he had the intent required to commit a carjacking and engage in the sale of 
counterfeit goods. When the drug charges, based largely on testimony from 26 jailhouse 
snitches, were dismissed, the evidence supporting the intent required for the other crimes eroded 
even though there might yet be room to find guilt. See id. at 1367–68.  
316 28 U.S.C. § 2513(a)(2).  
317 18 U.S.C. § 730(c) (repealed 1948) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 2513(a)(2)). 
318 S. REP. NO. 74-2339 (1936); United States v. Keegan, 71 F. Supp. 623, 638 (S.D.N.Y. 
1947).  
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Borchard adopted that bar, but his rationale was brief: “[t]his carries out simply 
the equitable maxim that no one shall profit by his own wrong or come into court with 
unclean hands.”319  
There are, in these examples which I will call the “Borchard list,” two types of 
disqualifying misconduct. The first are suspicious actions taken by an innocent person 
that one would expect a guilty person would do during or after a crime (flee, remove 
inculpatory evidence, induce false exculpatory evidence) to avoid detection or 
conviction. The second are actions taken by an innocent person for the opposite reason 
– to cast blame on themselves so as to take the fall for the actual culprit (false 
confession, removal of exculpatory evidence, inducing false inculpatory testimony).  
In both categories, the disqualifying acts need not themselves be crimes, but they 
“mislead[] the authorities as to his culpability.”320   
The problem with the Borchard list is two-fold. First, it does not seem to cover all 
of the possible behaviors contemplated by the substantially broader language of the 
statute. Surely, one could imagine forms of misconduct that arguably should be 
disqualifying but which are not ones intended to mislead the authorities toward or 
away from the plaintiff. Nor does the Borchard list include behavior that is negligent 
rather than intentional, leaving it uncertain what that type of behavior might be.  
Second, the Borchard list only includes conduct occurring after the alleged crime and 
is closely tied to the crime. One might imagine disqualifying acts that occur before or 
during the crime and that involve conduct separate and apart from the crime. This 
mismatch between the Borchard list and the statutory language has been a source of 
difficulty. 
At the same time, the broad statutory language could be read to encompass acts or 
omissions that appear suspicious (having a gun, driving a stolen car, being around 
drugs, associating with criminals) and begin a chain of events that lead to prosecution.  
After all, except in cases involving efforts to frame a person from the outset, there is 
usually something that causes the future exoneree to first become a suspect and later 
a criminal defendant. Viewed retrospectively, these acts appear innocent or 
explainable. But, one can prospectively view those acts as misconduct or neglect that 
caused the prosecution.   
Worse are cases in which the conduct started a chain of events that included police 
and/or prosecutorial misconduct. The statute does not by its terms qualify the term 
“prosecution” with words like “fair,” “just,” “proper,” or “lawful.” As discussed 
further below, sometimes government misconduct is the proximate or supervening 
cause of the prosecution, not the future plaintiff’s neglect or misconduct. But the 
statute does not define “cause.”  
Let’s begin with the nature and scope of “misconduct.” Recall the Betts case, the 
one involving the lawyer convicted of criminal contempt when he failed to attend a 
court hearing.321 He knew when the hearing was and wrote a letter to the judge saying 
 
319 EDWIN M. BORCHARD, EUROPEAN SYSTEMS OF STATE INDEMNITY FOR ERRORS OF 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, S. DOC. NO. 62-974, at 32 (1912). 
320 Betts v. United States, 10 F.3d 1278, 1285 (7th Cir. 1993). 
321 Id.  
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that he and his client could not attend.322 Later, Betts did not show up to his show 
cause order because he was hiding in another county to avoid an arrest warrant.323  
And, he did not show up for a rescheduled hearing.324   
Betts could not have handled this situation worse and his prosecution hardly seems 
unjustified. But, the Seventh Circuit earlier vacated his conviction and found him 
innocent on grounds that make his behavior seem at least somewhat less 
blameworthy.325 Some might think it was unfair to deny him a certificate of innocence. 
Yet, a fair reading of the misconduct provision points in the other direction.   
The Seventh Circuit seized on the Keegan court’s view that the language of the 
provision was “rather indefinite.”326 In order to understand the contours of 
disqualifying misconduct, the court examined the Borchard list327 and described it as 
barring compensation for those who would “have acted or failed to act in such a way 
as to mislead the authorities into thinking he had committed the offense” or who have 
“it within his means to avoid prosecution but elects not to do so, instead acting in such 
a way as to ensure it.”328 Betts’ failure to timely alert the court that he would not attend 
and his failure to attend these hearings were not designed to cast blame on another or 
himself.329 
This narrow interpretation of misconduct makes the Prong 3 analysis much easier 
for courts. The Betts court wanted to avoid having “to assess the virtue of a petitioner’s 
behavior even when it does not amount to a criminal offense.”330 There is no reason 
to make moral judgments that distinguish misconduct from something less. Moreover, 
the Betts court suggested that Prong 3’s disqualifying neglect or misconduct cannot be 
the alleged criminal act itself, of which the plaintiff has been proven innocent.331  
Rather, the disqualifying misconduct has to be something separate and apart from the 
acts underlying the crime itself, like those actions in the Borchard list.332   
 
322 Id. at 1280. 
323 Id. at 1281. 
324 Id.  
325 Id.  
326 Id. at 1284 (quoting United States v. Keegan, 71 F. Supp. 623, 638 (S.D.N.Y. 1947)). 
327 Id. at 1285 (quoting Keegan, 71 F. Supp. at 638).   
328 Id. (“[T]here must be either an affirmative act or an omission by the petitioner that 
misleads the authorities as to his culpability.”). 
329 Id. at 1285–86. 
330 Id. at 1285. 
331 Id. As the dissent in Graham put it, “[i]t must follow that to give meaning to all of the 
words in the statute, one cannot ‘cause’ one’s own prosecution by engaging in the very conduct 
which was found to be non-criminal in the first part of the inquiry.” United States v. Graham, 
608 F.3d 164, 180 (4th Cir. 2010) (Gregory, J., dissenting). 
332 Betts, 10 F.3d at 1285; Graham, 608 F.3d at 181 (Gregory, J., dissenting) (interpreting 
Betts as requiring “additional misconduct” that misleads the authorities). 
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The Fourth Circuit in United States v. Graham,333 however, took a much different 
approach.334 Graham was the Executive Director of several non-profits focused on the 
aging.335 His employment contract permitted him to convert his sick leave into cash 
if he became ill or his contract ended.336 In 2003, Graham asked the Board to convert 
some sick leave to cash without satisfying either condition. The Board, whose 
members had an average age of over 80, agreed.337 Graham converted additional sick 
leave hours to cash on his own in 2004.338 The Board found out and ordered Graham 
to return the funds, which he did.339 He was later indicted on 39 counts of fraud, tax 
violations, and embezzlement.340 
Following a bench trial, Graham was acquitted on all counts except the charge of 
embezzlement arising from the 2004 sick leave conversion.341 The court acquitted him 
of the 2003 conversion on the ground that his request for Board approval undercut his 
intent to steal.342 Presumably, if he intended to steal, he would not have raised the 
issue with the Board.343 Such, though, was the scenario with the 2004 conversion.344 
The Fourth Circuit reversed the conviction on appeal.345 It reasoned that since the 
Board had in 2003 permitted him to cash in his sick leave, Graham’s subsequent cash-
out without Board approval was also insufficient to demonstrate an intent to steal.346  
The Board effectively altered the terms of his employment contract. Graham then 
sought a certificate of innocence, which was denied by the district court.347 It reasoned 
 
333 Graham, 608 F.3d 164. 
334 See Amy Oxley, Not Innocent Enough: The Denial of a Certificate of Innocence Based 
on Neglect in United States v. Graham, 608 F.3d 164, 166 (4th Cir. 2010), 36 S. ILL. U. L.J. 
425, 426 (2012). 
335 Graham, 608 F.3d at 166. 
336 Id. at 167. 
337 Id. 
338 Id. 
339 Id.  
340 Id. 
341 United States v. Graham, No. CRIM 506-00025, 2006 WL 2527613, at *5 (S.D.W. Va. 
Aug. 30, 2006). 
342 Id. at *1. 
343 Id. 
344 Id. at *3. 
345 United States v. Graham, 269 F. App'x 281, 282 (4th Cir. 2008). 
346 Id. at 286. 
347 United States v. Graham, 595 F. Supp. 2d 681, 686 (S.D.W. Va. 2008). 
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that Graham’s actions constituted neglect and that brought about his prosecution.348  
The Fourth Circuit affirmed.349 
Based on a plain reading of the statute, it is not hard to see why. The court did not 
cite the Borchard list and try to shoehorn what Graham did into one of those examples.  
The court hewed closely instead to what Congress actually wrote.350 Contrary to the 
court in Betts, the Court held that the statute’s use of the terms misconduct or neglect 
required it to make a moral assessment about the petitioner’s behavior.351   
Although one could view Graham’s conduct as misconduct, the Fourth Circuit 
agreed with the district court that Graham’s self-dealing constituted “neglect.”352 This 
is just not the sort of thing that non-profit directors should be doing; he lined his 
pockets at the expense of his organization. On the other hand, the basis for the 
determination of innocence was that Graham’s board permitted him to do what he 
did.353 Perhaps Graham took advantage of an unsophisticated, older, and trusting 
board, but he did ask for permission which resulted in a de facto amendment to his 
contract.354 
The majority opinion in Graham rejected the notion advanced by the dissent and 
suggested in Betts that the disqualifying misconduct be something separate and apart 
from the acts charged.355 Graham’s distasteful but non-criminal self-dealing was 
squarely part and parcel of what the government charged. The majority said that if the 
disqualifying misconduct had to be something different from the charged acts, then 
the statute would have included language like “separate,” “other,” additional,” or 
“subsequent,” so indicating.356 
The Fourth Circuit’s dilemma was the one that the Betts court tried to avoid.  The 
Betts court acknowledged that Betts’ behavior was not “upstanding” and not “fitting 
behavior for an officer of the court.”357 It did not want to get into the business of 
finding misconduct in questionable but legal behavior because doing so might yield 
an uncomfortable conclusion that entirely lawful conduct can be disqualifying.358 The 
 
348 Id. at 686. 
349 United States v. Graham, 608 F.3d 164 (4th Cir. 2010). 
350 Id. at 171. 
351 Id. at 173–74. 
352 Graham, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 686. 
353 See Oxley, supra note 334, at 440. 
354 Graham, 608 F.3d at 169. 
355 Id. at 175–76. 
356 Id. at 175. 
357 Betts v. United States, 10 F.3d 1278, 1285 (7th Cir. 1993). 
358 To be sure, that behavior also has to cause the prosecution. When that behavior is the 
basis for the prosecution, that is a hard conclusion to avoid. The Betts court tried, in dicta, to 
say that it was not the proximate cause of the prosecution. That was the misreading of the order 
to command his presence in court on a particular date and time. Id. at 1285–86. 
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Fourth Circuit held, in effect, that the statute required it to assess the plaintiff’s moral 
virtue and, once it did, the statute gave it no choice but to find that Graham lost on 
Prong 3.   
United States v. Valle359 followed the Graham approach. Valle was a New York 
police officer who, over an extended period of time, discussed with others on the Dark 
Web his ideas to kidnap and sexually torture his wife and other women.360 He was 
convicted on conspiracy to kidnap, but the court set aside the conviction for lack of 
sufficient evidence.361 The court held that no reasonable juror could regard these 
conversations as reflective of actual intent rather than fantasy role playing, or could 
reasonably conclude that these conversations culminated in an actual plan to 
kidnap.362 Valle sought a certificate of innocence.363 
 If the word “misconduct” means anything at all, it has to cover Valle’s horrible 
actions. No difficult moral lines need be drawn here. Any reasonable judge would 
recoil at having to grant someone like Valle a certificate of innocence. It is therefore 
not surprising that the court rejected Valle’s argument that the court should follow 
Betts and require the disqualifying misconduct to be something separate and apart 
from the acts charged.364 The Valle court instead followed Graham, making the result 
an easy one – Valle’s vile behavior resulted in his prosecution.365   
The Valle court took comfort that in many cases, it would not be necessary to make 
these virtue assessments. One example is that no moral judgment would be needed 
“where a defendant is convicted based on the perjured testimony of a cooperating 
witness or law enforcement officer.” 366 That example, though, confuses the concepts 
of misconduct and causation. The misconduct of third parties or the government may 
be the proximate cause of the prosecution (or conviction) and thus make the lack of 
causation easier to prove by the plaintiff. But, Prong 3 requires the court to focus 
initially on the behavior of the plaintiff, not others.     
 
359 United States v. Valle, 467 F. Supp. 3d 194, 196 (S.D.N.Y.). 
360 Id. 
361 Id. at 200. 
362 Id. at 199. 
363 The Court held that Valle met Prong 2 because “it is more likely than not the case that 
Valle is innocent of the kidnapping conspiracy charge. . . .” Id. at 203. The Court misreads 
Prong 2(A). The question is not whether he is innocent of the crime, but whether he committed 
any of the acts charged. Here, those acts would certainly have included engaging in these 
horrible conversations. The Mills court would have had no difficulty rejecting the petition on 
that ground. 
364 Id. at 205. 
365 Id. at 208–09. 
366 Id. at 205. 
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An example is Gates v. District of Columbia,367 a case in which the plaintiff sought 
compensation under the D.C. Unjust Imprisonment Act.368 Gates alleged and a jury 
later agreed that two police officers induced a snitch to falsely testify that he heard 
Gates confess the crime to him, exactly the scenario noted in Valle.369   
The D.C. Act precludes compensation for those who “by his or her misconduct, 
cause or bring about his or her own prosecution.”370 In Gates, the defendant had 
attempted to snatch the purse of a young woman in the same area in which a 
subsequent rape and murder of another young woman had occurred.371 That earlier 
crime made Gates a suspect in the latter.372 The District of Columbia argued that there 
was a causal connection between the earlier crime and Gates’ prosecution for the 
rape/murder that he did not commit.373 Thus, it argued, Gates failed Prong 3. 
In Gates, the government pointed to disqualifying misconduct separate and apart 
from the acts underlying the crime charged and behavior not on the Borchard list.374  
While Graham held that the statute did not require the alleged misconduct to be 
separate from the crime, it did not hold that it may not be independent.375 With respect 
to causation, but for Gates’ earlier nearby purse snatching, he would not have appeared 
on the police radar, and if that had not triggered suspicion, he would not have been 
prosecuted. 
Just as Valle is the sort of person one would not want to compensate, Gates is 
precisely the sort of person one would. As a result of police misconduct, he was 
incarcerated for twenty-seven years for a rape and murder that DNA analysis 
concluded he did not commit.376 But, the two cases could have come out the same 
way. The statute does not distinguish between cases in which the alleged misconduct 
is part and parcel of the crime for which the person is innocent (Graham, Valle) and 
those in which it is separate and apart (Gates).  
 The court in Gates could have solved this problem by relying on causation. Gates’ 
purse-snatching did not cause his prosecution; the police misconduct was the 
supervening cause that did. Betts makes the same sort of point. Betts did not cause his 
 
367 Gates v. District of Columbia, 66 F. Supp. 3d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 2014). In the interest of full 
disclosure, the author was one of the attorneys representing Mr. Gates. 
368 The version of the Unjust Imprisonment Act in place during the Gates litigation may be 
found at D.C. CODE § 2-421(2020). 
369 Complaint at ¶ 6–7, Gates, 66 F. Supp. 3d 1 (No. 0009643-10). 
370 D.C. CODE § 2-422(a)(4) (2020). The D.C. Act differs from the federal statute only by 
omitting the words “or neglect.” 
371 Complaint at ¶ 31, Gates, 66 F. Supp. 3d 1 (No. 0009643-10). 
372 Id. at ¶ 32. 
373 Id. 
374 Gates, 66 F. Supp. 3d at 15–16. 
375 Id. at 15 (citing United States v. Graham, 608 F.3d 164, 170 (4th Cir. 2010)). 
376 Complaint at ¶ 1, Gates, 66 F. Supp. 3d 1 (No. 0009643-10). 
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prosecution; the government’s misreading of the unclear court order regarding the 
hearing date did.377 But, the Gates court did not do that.     
The district court rejected the District’s argument, but not because, as Valle 
suggests, it was unnecessary in wrongful conviction cases involving police 
misconduct to assess whether the earlier crime was misconduct. Instead, the Gates 
court held that the prior crime did not “establish any of the essential elements of the 
charges in [the] rape and murder,” and that the “past crimes were not part of the same 
enterprise of illegal activity.”378 The court identified the type of misconduct that the 
D.C. Council suggested would be disqualifying.379 Relying on caselaw developed 
under Section 2513, and referring to the Borchard list of disqualifying misconduct, the 
court held that a prior crime fell outside that list.380 Instead, it was “separate and 
distinct” from the crime for which Gates was convicted and occurred outside “the time 
of the crime at issue or immediately afterwards.”381 Thus, it could not serve as a basis 
for disqualifying misconduct. The logic was opposite of that of Betts. While Graham 
and Valle suggest that the disqualifying misconduct can be part of the crime, Gates 
held that it must be.382 
The court was worried that the District's reading of “misconduct” would yield a 
conclusion that “anyone who has been rightfully convicted or arrested of a crime in 
the past is no longer able to recover.”383 That’s not a fair slippery slope conclusion to 
draw. This was not a case in which Gates’ general rap sheet caused him to be 
prosecuted. The real question is the required causal connection between the 
misconduct and the prosecution. And there was such a connection, although the 
intervening police misconduct broke it in Gates.384 
   Limiting an interpretation of the statute to the Borchard list – acts that mislead 
authorities as to one’s culpability – might not be entirely satisfactory either. A classic 
act that misleads police in this way is featured in every police show: not talking to the 
 
377 Betts v. United States, 10 F.3d 1278, 1285–86 (7th Cir. 1993). 
378 Gates, 66 F. Supp. 3d at 14. 
379 “Congress intended [the federal statute] to preclude a certificate [of actual innocence] 
‘[w]here there has been an attempt to flee, a false confession, the removal of evidence, or an 
attempt to induce a witness or an expert to give false testimony or opinion, or an analogous 
attempt to suppress such testimony or opinion.’” Id. (citing Graham, 608 F.3d at 173–74) 
(alteration in original). 
380 Id. 
381 Id. at 16. 
382 For a case following Gates, see Ruffin v. United States, 135 A.3d 799 (D.C. 2016). 
383 Gates, 66 F. Supp. 3d at 16. 
384 In the Gates case, there were allegations, proven at trial, that the chain of causation was 
effectively superseded by several acts of police misconduct that were the proximate cause of 
Gates’ prosecution. Id. at 8. 
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police. Eastridge v. United States385 is, in part, an example. Three men and Jones were 
convicted of stabbing a man to death.386 Of the three, one had passed away in prison, 
and the other two, Eastridge and Sousa, were found innocent following a habeas 
proceeding.387 The United States, however, argued that their ties to Jones and the 
crime constituted disqualifying misconduct.388 Those connections included helping 
Jones escape, refusing to reveal any information about the murder in keeping with a 
“Pagan Code,” and concealing knives.389 
These are tenable arguments, but this case also involved a situation in which 
“[p]etitioners sat in prison for decades after a prosecution with shifting theories and 
an unconstitutional vise that severely restricted their trial defense. . . . It would make 
a mockery of the Unjust Conviction Act if these Petitioners were denied a remedy for 
the unrelated misconduct upon which the Government rests its argument.”390  
The statute, though, could have been so interpreted. 
One might argue that there was a causal connection between their failure to provide 
potentially exculpatory information and their prosecution. After all, they had the 
means to avoid prosecution, perhaps by fingering Jones and/or offering an alibi, but 
intentionally chose not to deploy them. Asserting one’s Fifth Amendment rights, even 
if doing so is in keeping with some “Pagan Code,” is perhaps not misconduct, but it 
misleads police every day into thinking that the person might be culpable. It may be 
that their silence drew the suspicion of the police and was a factor in the decision to 
prosecute.     
The court avoided that result by holding, like Gates, that none of their “actions or 
omissions was related to the charged crime.”391 In particular, the court acknowledged 
that helping the murderer escape was a closer question, but suggested that, since there 
was no evidence that the men knew Jones killed the victim, driving him was not 
misconduct.392 But, in reality, these acts and omissions were related to the murder, 
more closely than Gates’ purse snatching was related to the later rape and murder for 
which he was wrongly convicted.   
Again, the result seems to be a good one. These men were innocent of murder, but 
they had certain connections to it that made them “murder adjacent.” The court 
understandably explains why they were exonerated in the first place.393 In light of the 
exoneration, these actions which may have appeared suspicious when the crime was 
 
385 Eastridge v. United States, 602 F. Supp. 2d 66, 71 (D.D.C. 2009), aff’d sub nom. Diamen 
v. United States, 604 F.3d 653 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
386 Id. at 68. 
387 Eastridge v. United States, 372 F. Supp. 2d 26, 29 n.3 (D.D.C. 2005). 
388 Eastridge, 602 F. Supp. 2d at 71. 
389 Id. 
390 Id. at 73. 
391 Id. at 71. 
392 Id. 
393 Id. at 72. 
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investigated now appear innocent and unrelated. But, the statute’s focus on what 
actually caused the prosecution does not appear to contemplate this sort of 
retrospective logic.  
Even more difficult are cases in which it is shown that either 1) no crime actually 
occurred or 2) the plaintiff can show innocence by a preponderance of the evidence, 
but the potentially disqualifying acts of misconduct or negligence are related to the 
charged crime. In both, almost by definition, there is some inculpatory evidence.  
Either that evidence, which looks suspicious, does not add up to a criminal act, or 
innocence is established because that evidence is outweighed by exculpatory facts. If 
the existence of those suspicious inculpatory facts alone causes the plaintiff to fail 
Prong 3, then a lot of innocent people would not be compensated.   
At bottom, Prong 3 must be handled with care because, when it applies, it denies 
compensation to people who have demonstrated their innocence. The language of the 
statute does not distinguish between cases like Valle and Gates that rest on the polar 
opposites of Borchard’s conception of the “deserving.” Thus, again, courts have dealt 
with the statute by inconsistently employing extra-statutory concepts like virtue 
assessment, the relationship between the alleged conduct and the crime, and notions 
of causation to arrive at results they regard as just. 
V. ABU-SHAWISH TO THE RESCUE 
As we have seen, the federal wrongful conviction compensation statute has a long 
and checkered history. It is plagued by statutory language that is either unexplained or 
erroneously described in the legislative history, and by interpretations of that language 
which adhere to it but are bad policy, or are unfaithful to it and reflective of sound 
policy. Together, the statute has become at least partly unmoored from even 
Borchard’s limited vision of its scope. The remarkable and unusual case of Mhammad 
Abu-Shawish offers an interesting opportunity to stress-test the statute and to rethink 
it.   
Mhammad Abu-Shawish was the executive director of Arabian Fest/American 
Festival, Inc, a non-profit organization that hoped to redevelop a portion of 
Milwaukee’s Muskego Avenue.394 In 2001, his organization sought a grant to research 
and prepare a development proposal from a Milwaukee city entity that distributed 
block grant funding from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development.395  
Abu-Shawish’s organization received $75,000.396   
About a year later, Abu-Shawish submitted his redevelopment plan to the city.397  
The problem was that the plan was almost identical to another plan prepared for a 
different Milwaukee non-profit.398 Because HUD had paid for a proposal that Abu-
Shawish seemingly did not prepare, he was charged with federal program fraud. 399 18 
 
394 United States v. Abu-Shawish, 507 F.3d 550, 552 (7th Cir. 2007). 
395 Id. 
396 Id. 
397 Id. at 552–53. 
398 Id. at 553. 
399 Id. 
53Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2021
272 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [69:219 
U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(A) prohibits theft from organizations receiving federal assistance 
funds, here, the City of Milwaukee.400   
In 2005, following a trial before Judge J.P. Stadtmueller in which he testified on 
his own behalf, a federal jury found Abu-Shawish guilty and he was sentenced to three 
years in prison.401 On appeal, Abu-Shawish argued that the statute he was convicted 
of violating required that the defendant be an agent of the defrauded entity.402 His 
argument was simple – because he was not an agent of the City of Milwaukee, he 
could not have violated this statute.403 The Seventh Circuit agreed, and his conviction 
was vacated.404 By this time, he had already served his sentence.405        
With a measure of judicial exasperation, the court concluded that the government 
charged Abu-Shawish with the wrong crime.406 The court flatly concluded that the 
evidence did show that he defrauded Milwaukee.407 It wondered whether he should 
have instead been prosecuted for mail or wire fraud.408 Not surprisingly, federal 
prosecutors took the hint, and indicted him for mail and wire fraud and transporting 
money obtained fraudulently.409 This time, following a 2008 trial in which he did not 
testify, Abu-Shawish was acquitted.410 
At first glance, from a compensatory perspective, this case looks like a long-shot.  
First, his conviction for a federal fraud charge was reversed on grounds that the 
legislative history specifically regarded as “technical” or “procedural.” The indictment 
was faulty; it charged him with a crime that he could not have committed because his 
status did not satisfy one of the essential elements of the crime.   
Second, at Abu-Shawish’s sentencing hearing in which the court considered a 
sentence enhancement for obstruction of justice, Judge Statmueller, who fifteen years 
later would decide Abu-Shawish’s petition for a certificate of innocence, savaged his 
credibility. Stating that Abu-Shawish’s conduct “just defies all reality,” the judge 
regarded him as a “prevaricator, someone who will twist the acts to meet his view of 
what the law ought to be.”411 For Judge Stadtmueller, this was “not even a close 
 
400 Id. at 553–54. 
401 Id. at 553. 
402 Id. at 555. 
403 Id. 
404 Id. at 558. 
405 United States v. Abu-Shawish 898 F.3d 726, 731 (7th Cir. 2018). 
406 Abu-Shawish, 507 F.3d at 558. 
407 Id. 
408 Id. 
409 Abu-Shawish, 898 F.3d at 732. 
410 Id.  
411 United States v. Abu-Shawish, No. 03-CR-211-1, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132322, at *22. 
(E.D. Wis. July 27, 2020). 
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question,” even though he thought the Seventh Circuit might come to a different 
view.412 The Seventh Circuit, though, did more than hint that Abu-Shawish was guilty 
of different sorts of frauds, for which he was later charged, but acquitted. 
Third, there was essentially no dispute that he committed the acts for which he was 
twice charged. That fundamental act was submitting a plan for which his organization 
was given a grant that was nearly identical to a plan furnished by another group. His 
claim of innocence rested on grounds of intent: that he did not intend to defraud.413  
His burden was a difficult one because he must prove a negative – that he lacked 
fraudulent intent.   
Fourth, given that he did submit this plagiarized plan, he would seemingly have to 
wrestle with the question of whether his misconduct or neglect caused his prosecution.  
Despite these apparently insurmountable hurdles, Abu-Shawish won a certificate of 
innocence.414    
In 2014, Abu-Shawish undertook a convoluted procedural path to obtain a 
certificate of innocence.415 In 2015, he petitioned for a certificate of innocence in the 
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, the court of conviction.416  
In 2017, the district court dismissed his petition without even waiting for the 
government to respond, much less holding an evidentiary hearing.417 On appeal, the 
Seventh Circuit reviewed the federal wrongful conviction compensation statute and 
reversed on procedural grounds.418 It held that the district court imposed too high a 
pleading standard on Abu-Shawish, erroneously requiring him to offer in his 
complaint evidence of innocence when Rule 8 only required him to allege it.419 It 
ordered the district court to proceed to the merits and to allow both sides to present 
evidence.420 
The Seventh Circuit took a tour through the legislative history of the statute and, 
like courts before it, noted that “the statute’s distinction between acquittal and 
innocence as setting a high bar for petitioners.”421 It quoted from the House Report 
that “[t]he claimant cannot be one whose innocence is based on technical or procedural 
 
412 Id. 
413 Id. at *23.  
414 On September 14, 2020, the United States appealed that award to the Seventh Circuit.  
United States v. Abu-Shawish, No. 20-2748 (7th Cir. Sept. 14, 2020). It dismissed the appeal 
on October 16, 2020 after consultation with the Office of the Solicitor General. Docket 4, Abu-
Shawish, No. 20-2748 (7th Cir. Oct. 16, 2020). 
415 United States v. Abu-Shawish, 228 F. Supp. 3d 878, 881 (E.D. Wis. 2017).  
416 Id. at 880.  
417 Id. at 881–82.  
418 Abu-Shawish v. United States, 898 F.3d 726, 740 (7th Cir. 2018). 
419 Id. at 737–38. 
420 Id. at 738.  
421 Id. at 735. 
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grounds, such as lack of sufficient evidence, or a faulty indictment.”422 It repeated the 
notion that Congress did not intend that every person whose conviction was set aside 
to be compensated.423 It noted that Abu-Shawish had the burden of production and 
persuasion.424 It said that the statute is strictly interpreted as a waiver of sovereign 
immunity.425 History was not on Abu-Shawish’s side either; only in Betts had a court 
reversed the denial of a petition for a certificate of innocence. It did all the table-setting 
courts do when they are poised to deny a petition for a certificate of innocence. 
Still, although it is a steep climb for people like Abu-Shawish, the Seventh Circuit 
held that it was wrong for the district court not to let Abu-Shawish try.426 While it had 
wide discretion in the absence of statutory procedures to craft a process for deciding 
the petition, it could not simply dismiss it when it satisfied Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 8’s pleading requirements. The court then proceeded to the prongs of proof. 
A. Prong 1 
Abu-Shawish is a very unusual case. In virtually all cases, after a conviction is 
reversed, the government will either drop the charges or retry them. Here, because 
Abu-Shawish was initially charged, tried, and convicted of a crime the elements of 
which could not fit the undisputed facts, the government retried him for violating 
different criminal statutes that it believed better fit those facts.   
This odd scenario requires us to pause at Prong 1. This is a Prong 1(A) case. The 
crime for which he was wrongly convicted was federal program fraud. Had Abu-
Shawish been retried and acquitted for that crime, Prong 1(B) would surely apply.  
But, here, he was found not guilty on retrial not of the crime for which his conviction 
was reversed, but of different ones.427 Looking at Prong 1(A), the Seventh Circuit 
quickly found it to have been satisfied because his conviction “was reversed on the 
merits.”428 
The court’s interpretation of Prong 1 was not faithful to the language of the statute.  
The question that the statute poses is not whether the reversal was “on the merits,” but 
whether the conviction was set aside on the ground that he was “not guilty of the 
offense of which he was convicted.” Was this the case for Abu-Shawish? 
On one hand, this seems an easier case than Maria Hernandez’s. Her conviction 
was reversed on ineffective assistance of counsel grounds, a rationale grounded in her 
right to a fair trial, not on her guilt or innocence. For the drafters of the 1948 statute 
and the court in Hernandez interpreting it, the basis for the reversal was insufficiently 
connected to her substantive guilt or innocence to welcome her into the ranks of the 
 
422 Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 75-2299, at 2 (1938)). 
423 Id. at 735. 
424 Id. at 733. 
425 Id. 
426 Id. at 738. 
427 28 U.S.C. § 2513(a)(1)’s Prong B says that “on new trial or rehearing he was found not 
guilty of such offense” (emphasis added). He was not tried for “such offense.” 
428 Abu-Shawish v. United States, 898 F.3d 726, 739 (7th Cir. 2018). 
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potentially deserving. She got off on a procedural technicality; she might have still 
done the crime. 
In contrast, Abu-Shawish could never have committed the crime of federal 
program fraud because the undisputed evidence was that he was not employed by the 
defrauded party, a prerequisite to conviction under the statute.429 His guilt, like that 
of Betts, was a legal impossibility. Thus, it could be concluded that his conviction was 
set aside on the “ground that he is not guilty of the offense.” The Seventh Circuit could 
have said that, but it did not. 
On the other hand, a less forgiving court could conclude that his conviction was 
not set aside on grounds that he was not guilty, but on grounds that the indictment was 
faulty. Thus, Abu-Shawish falls within the disfavored class of persons specifically 
mentioned in the legislative history who benefited from a technical reversal.430  
Cummings would view Abu-Shawish as someone whose conviction was reversed on 
whether “the facts charged and proven constituted an offense under some statute.”431   
Like Hernandez, his conviction was set aside not because of his innocent actions, but 
the blameworthy actions of a third party – for Hernandez, her poor lawyer, and for 
Abu-Shawish, his prosecutor charging the wrong crime.  
On balance, this latter argument should not carry the day. It was particularly 
unlikely in the Seventh Circuit, which has held that reversals of convictions for failure 
of proof, also specifically mentioned as technical or procedural in the legislative 
history,432 nevertheless satisfy Prong 1.433 Abu-Shawish rightly survived Prong 1, but 
his path to success was not quite as straightforward as the court made it seem and 
might not have been possible outside the Seventh Circuit. 
 
B.  Prong 2: And/Or 
 
That brings us to Prong 2 and requires a brief re-examination of the “and/or” 
problem in the statute discussed above. With respect to innocence, what does Abu-
Shawish have to prove? Prong 2(A) requires him to prove that he did not commit “any 
of the acts charged.” The federal program charge or the mail fraud charge? Or both?  
Alternatively, or in addition, does he have to show that he did not commit any 
uncharged offenses? Prong 2(A) and/or Prong 2(B)? 
This does not seem like a difficult question. One asks for a certificate of innocence 
of crimes for which one was wrongly convicted and imprisoned. That would be the 
 
429 United States v. Abu-Shawish, No. 03-CR-211-1, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132322, at *2. 
(E.D. Wis. July 27, 2020). 
430 H.R. REP. NO. 75-2299, at 2 (1938) (listing “faulty indictment” as the type of reversal 
that does not prove innocence). 
431 Id. at 3. 
432 Id. at 2. 
433 Pulungan v. United States, 722 F.3d 983, 984 (7th Cir. 2013). The plaintiff was charged 
with attempting to export defense articles without a license. His conviction was reversed when 
the Seventh Circuit concluded that the evidence did not show beyond a reasonable doubt that 
he knew that the items in question were defense articles or that licenses were required to export 
them.  
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federal program fraud charge for which Abu-Shawish was imprisoned for three years 
and, thus, if successful, would entitle him to receive about $150,000. He would have 
to show, in Prong 2(A), that he did not commit any of the acts charged in the federal 
program fraud indictment.   
That would seem close to impossible because he did commit the key act charged 
– submitting the report.434 But, a court in the Seventh Circuit (like the Eastern District 
of Wisconsin), bound to follow Betts, would (mis)interpret “acts” as “crime,” 
conclude that, like Betts, Abu-Shawish’s conviction was a legal impossibility, that he 
was necessarily innocent of that charge, and that Prong 2(A) was therefore satisfied.  
If he need only prove Prong 2(A), Abu-Shawish moves on to Prong 3 without ever 
having to prove innocence of mail fraud and similar crimes. 
Recall that Borchard’s original proposal would have required Abu-Shawish to 
prove that he was innocent of the act charged and other offenses against the United 
States. However, the statute that emerged said “or” instead.435 The odd posture of the 
Abu-Shawish case highlights the wisdom of Borchard’s conjunctive requirement. He 
viewed the deserving as those innocent of the crime for which they were wrongly 
convicted (here, federal program fraud) and of any other related crimes (here, mail 
fraud). He would not be happy that the eventual statute appears to be unintentionally 
helpful to Abu-Shawish. What did the Seventh Circuit have to say about this?   
Although it is not completely free from doubt, the court seemed to have interpreted 
Abu-Shawish’s burden consistent with what the statute should have said, not what it 
actually did say. The court decided “Abu-Shawish’s claim will succeed or fail based 
on the second requirement – whether his actions constituted any crime under federal 
or state law.”436 It appears to suggest that Abu-Shawish has to prove innocence of any 
crime, charged or uncharged, relating to his Milwaukee grant.   
Thus, it seems that Abu-Shawish’s burden on remand was demonstrating that he 
satisfied Prong 2(B). However, is that because it was clear to the court that he had or 
could easily satisfy Prong 2(A), using Betts, and that he must also satisfy Prong 2(B) 
(supporting a conjunctive interpretation)? Or, is that because Abu-Shawish could not 
satisfy Prong 2(A) and thus had to satisfy Prong 2(B) (supporting a disjunctive 
interpretation)? The court does not say, but if the court had Betts in mind, the former 
possibility is more likely than the latter.437 The Seventh Circuit again read the statute 
in a manner that makes sense as a matter of policy, but not as a matter of sound 
statutory interpretation. 
 
434 See Indictment at ¶ 18, United States v. Abu-Shawish, No. 03-cr-00211 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 
7, 2003), ECF No. 6.   
435 Most courts have interpreted Prong 2 in the disjunctive. See United States v. Mills, 773 
F.3d 563, 567 (4th Cir. 2014); Osborn v. United States, 322 F.2d 835, 841 (5th Cir. 1963). But 
see Hadley v. United States, 66 F. Supp. 140, 141–42 (Ct. Cl. 1946). 
436 Abu-Shawish v. United States, 898 F.3d 726, 739 (7th Cir. 2018). See Report and 
Recommendation Granting Petition for Certificate of Innocence at 17, United States v. Abu-
Shawish, No. 03-CR-00211 (E.D. Wis. Jan.12, 2017), ECF No. 344 [hereinafter Abu-Shawish 
R. & R.]. Note that the court uses the word “crime” that is not in the statute. 
437 But see Abu-Shawish R. & R., supra note 436, at 17–18 (stating that Prong 2(A) and 
Prong 2(B) are phrased in the disjunctive). 
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C.     Prong 2: Room/Preponderance 
The district court had no occasion to wrestle with this problem. The parties briefed 
this as a Prong 2(B) case – whether he showed by a preponderance of the evidence 
that his acts or omissions did not constitute mail fraud.438 In his opening brief in 
support of his Petition for a Certificate of Innocence, Abu-Shawish argued that fraud 
requires proof of specific intent that he did not have.439 On the surface, demonstrating 
innocence through lack of intent seems particularly difficult. Claims of lack of intent 
turn on questions of knowledge and motive and thus, on the credibility of the actor.  
These types of cases would seem particularly susceptible to “room thinking” because 
dents in credibility and inferences drawn from logic can leave room for the possibility 
of guilt. That certainly seemed to be the case here where Abu-Shawish’s credibility 
was seriously doubted by the court. 
Magistrate Judge Nancy Joseph held an evidentiary hearing on July 30, 2019 
during which Abu-Shawish testified.440 She reviewed the transcripts of both trials, 
received evidence submitted by the parties, and issued her Report and 
Recommendation on December 10, 2019.441 She and Judge Stadtmueller, who 
reviewed her Report and Recommendation, focused on whether Abu-Shawish was 
innocent of mail fraud and transporting goods fraud, with a particular eye as to whether 
he had specific intent to defraud by plagiarizing the report.442 
Judge Stadtmueller could have easily rested on his prior doubts about Abu-
Shawish’s credibility and, in them, found the room necessary to deny the petition on 
the ground that Abu-Shawish had failed to demonstrate that he was “truly” or 
“entirely” innocent of fraud. But, he did not: 
This Court has repeatedly – and reasonably expressed serious incredulity 
about Abu-Shawish’s version of the events. But even if Abu-Shawish’s 
testimony is appropriately considered through the lens of extreme skepticism, 
the surrounding evidence corroborates it.443   
Relying on the evidence in the 2008 trial, Judge Stadtmueller ultimately concluded 
to apparently his own surprise, that “against all odds, Abu-Shawish has demonstrated 
 
438 See Memorandum in Support of Defendant’s Petition for Certificate of Innocence at 12, 
United States v. Abu-Shawish, No. 03-CR-00211 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 12, 2017), ECF No. 330; see 
also Abu-Shawish R. & R., supra note 436, at 19. 
439 I’m ignoring the crime of transporting more than $5,000 obtained by fraud in foreign 
commerce. Memorandum in Support of Defendant’s Petition for Certificate of Innocence, supra 
note 438, at 12. 
440 Abu-Shawish R. & R., supra note 436, at 5.  
441 Abu-Shawish R. & R, supra note 436. 
442 Id. at 18–19; United States v. Abu-Shawish, No. 03-CR-211-1, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
132322, at *4 (E.D. Dist. Wis. July 27, 2020).  
443 Abu-Shawish, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132322, at *26. 
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by a preponderance of the evidence that he is innocent of any crime involving fraud, 
deprivation, or misappropriation of property.”444  
To see how Abu-Shawish snatched victory from the jaws of defeat, more 
background is needed. Abu-Shawish led the annual Arabian Fest cultural event in 
Milwaukee, and it was quite successful.445 He wanted to use a portion of Muskego 
Avenue as a destination place for a thriving Arab-American business community. He 
pitched the idea to a new alderman, Donovan, who liked the idea and suggested that 
he seek a grant.446 At the same time, Donovan was the founder of his own non-profit, 
Milwaukee Alliance, and aspired to redevelop a larger portion of Muskego Avenue.447 
One of Milwaukee Alliance’s employees, Sanfilippo, contacted a professor, Roth, 
to write a plan for the revitalization of the area.448 Not surprisingly, given their mutual 
interests, the paths of Roth and Abu-Shawish crossed, and they attended meetings 
together.449 During this research phase, Donovan assigned Sanfilippo and her cousin 
to help Abu-Shawish with the project to develop a business plan to recruit new 
businesses to Muskego Avenue for which he had received a $75,000 grant from the 
city.450   
Ultimately, Roth finished his 35-page report for circulation and included 
information that Sanfilippo had compiled under Abu-Shawish’s supervision.451 Roth 
was not enthusiastic about an Arabic business center in a Hispanic neighborhood, so 
his report spoke more generally of an international business district.452 Sanfilippo 
received the report and shared it with Donovan.453 Donovan thought that the report 
focused too much on Milwaukee Alliance interests and too little on those of other 
stakeholders in the redevelopment plan. So, at his direction, Sanfilippo edited it and 
made it more general so that other groups could use the plan.454 The edited report was 
apparently reduced to twenty-two pages and did not specifically mention the Arab-
American business center Abu-Shawish championed.455 
 
444 Id. at *37. 
445 Id. at *9; see also Abu-Shawish R. & R., supra note 436, at 6. 
446 Abu-Shawish R. & R., supra note 436, at 7. 
447 Id.  
448 Abu-Shawish, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132322, at *10. 
449 Id. at *11; Abu-Shawish R. & R., supra note 436, at 8, 10. 
450 Abu-Shawish, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132322, at *11–13. 
451 Id. at *15–16. Roth was paid from a city HUD grant through Milwaukee Alliance. 
452 Abu-Shawish R. & R., supra note 436, at 12. 
453 Id.  
454 Abu-Shawish, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132322, at *16–17. 
455 Id. at *17. 
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Donovan told Sanfilippo to send the report to Abu-Shawish, which she did.456  
Abu-Shawish did not look at the report for several months; he spent time on other 
aspects of redevelopment planning.457 When he did look at the report, he testified that 
he thought it was Sanfilippo’s final draft.458 Still, it did not mention Arabian Fest, so 
Abu-Shawish made a few small changes to it, such as adding references to Arabian 
Fest, and submitted it to the City.459 
Although the court did not explicitly use a burden shifting analysis, its reasoning 
was consistent with such an approach. Abu-Shawish could show innocence if he were 
able to demonstrate that he did not know that Roth was preparing a report for another 
group, and that he had not seen the Roth report prior to submitting his own on behalf 
of Arabian Fest.460 A prima facie case would require Abu-Shawish to advance 
credible evidence of this lack of knowledge. He testified to that effect at his trial and 
at the evidentiary hearing.461 
The burden then shifted to the government. The Government’s argument was that 
assessing Abu-Shawish’s claims of lack of intent turn on his credibility. It contended 
that a prior conviction for mortgage fraud and suggestions by the trial judge in his 
federal program fraud trial that he likely obstructed justice by lying in his testimony 
shattered his credibility.462 As a result, the Government argued that Abu-Shawish’s 
assertions of a lack of culpable intent should be disregarded.463 Without them, the 
substantial similarity between the Roth report and his submission and the fact that the 
men met and worked together on this project permit an inference that Abu-Shawish 
took the Roth report and passed it off as his own.464 That would shift the burden back 
to Abu-Shawish. The court said repeatedly that his burden was to demonstrate 
innocence by a preponderance of the evidence.465 
The court agreed that Abu-Shawish had credibility problems but concluded that he 
had shown by a preponderance of the evidence that he had no specific intent to defraud 
the City.466 The court found that Donovan’s Milwaukee Alliance general 
redevelopment plan for Muskego Avenue and Abu-Shawish’s more limited project for 
 
456 Abu-Shawish R. & R., supra note 436, at 13. 
457 Id. at 14.  
458 Id. 
459 Abu-Shawish, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132322, at *18. 
460 Abu-Shawish R. & R., supra note 436, at 18. 
461 Id. at 14. 
462 Abu-Shawish, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132322, at *19–20. 
463 Government’s Memorandum in Opposition to a Certificate of Innocence at 10, United 
States v. Abu-Shawish, No. 03-CR-00211 (E.D. Wis. Jan.12, 2017); see also Abu-Shawish, 
2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132322, at *25. 
464 See Abu-Shawish, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132322, at *24. 
465 Id. at *7–8, *23–25, *28, *37. 
466 Id. at *27, *34; Abu-Shawish R. & R., supra note 436, at 19. 
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an Arab-American-centered redevelopment of a portion of the street blurred, resulting 
in confusion about their purposes, personnel, and specific role of Roth and his 
report.467 Judge Joseph credited Abu-Shawish’s testimony that he thought Roth was 
providing research for the Arabian Fest plan, and that he did not know that Roth was 
writing a report for Milwaukee Alliance.468   
The court recognized that a comparison of the Roth report and Abu-Shawish report 
shows them to be very similar, but the court did not regard that similarity as proof of 
intent.469 Instead, the court concluded that there was no evidence that Abu-Shawish 
knew of Roth’s report or had seen the first draft of it which referred extensively to the 
Milwaukee Alliance.470 Instead, the court credited Defilippo’s testimony that she 
made changes to the Roth report at Donovan’s direction before providing a copy to 
Abu-Shawish.471 Indeed, the 35-page Roth report was cut to a smaller document, and 
FBI searches of Abu-Shawish’s residence did not uncover the original Roth report.472   
The court observed that the City grant did not actually require Abu-Shawish 
himself to write the plan.473 Even if the plan did not have much value given the 
separate submission of the Roth plan, Abu-Shawish and his subordinates did business 
development, neighborhood improvement, and data compilation work that added 
value to the report, leading the court to conclude that the City was not defrauded.474  
In any event, the court concluded that Abu-Shawish reasonably believed that 
Sanfilippo’s work product was the result of a “collective plan” of several people, 
including himself, and not the sole product of Roth.475       
The court found that Abu-Shawish “did not subjectively realize that he was not 
supposed to use the report that [Sanfilippo] gave him and present it as a product of 
Arabian Fest.”476 The court did not resort to “room” thinking. It did not focus its 
attention solely on the inculpatory facts. The opinion instead reflects a careful and 
balanced weighing of difficult facts. A “room thinking” approach would be easier.  
Abu-Shawish’s credibility issues, the substantial similarity in the reports, his frequent 
contact with Roth, and receipt of a draft report that oddly omitted any mention of 
Arabian Fest create room for the possibility of guilt. The court did not ignore those 
 
467 Abu-Shawish, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132322, at *26–27, *32–33; Abu-Shawish R. & R., 
supra note 436, at 20–21. 
468 Abu-Shawish R. & R., supra note 436, at 22. 
469 Abu-Shawish, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132322, at *28. 
470 Id. at *36. 
471 Id. at *27; Abu-Shawish R. & R., supra note 436, at 23. 
472 Abu-Shawish, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132322, at *27, *31; Abu-Shawish R. & R., supra 
note 436, at 22–23. 
473 Abu-Shawish, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132322, at *28. 
474 Id. at *29; Abu-Shawish R. & R., supra note 436, 25–26. 
475 Abu-Shawish, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132322, at *35–36. 
476 Id. at *34–35. 
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issues, but it did not solely focus on them either. Nor did it simply accept Abu-
Shawish’s story without question. Instead, it placed reliance on the credible testimony 
of third parties and carefully weighed the competing evidence and inferences, mindful 
of the preponderance standard.   
D.     Prong 3 
In Abu-Shawish, the government did not make a Prong 3 argument.477 But, it might 
have argued that Abu-Shawish’s behavior was something like Graham’s. He 
understood that he was to provide the City a report. Submitting a proposal in 
connection with a government grant is a big deal. Presumably, one would want the 
proposal to be very compelling so that the City would be inclined to implement it. At 
worst, one might worry that if the report were terrible, the city might ask questions 
about why it provided a grant for it. Submitting the grant-required report requires care 
and attention.   
However, the government might argue that Abu-Shawish made only a few small 
technical changes to it. Had he studied it with the care and attention it deserved, and 
asked questions like why there was no mention of Arabian Fest, he might have come 
to see the similarity between it and the Roth report. The government would argue that 
was at least neglect. His submission of a seemingly plagiarized report certainly caused 
his prosecution. 
Had that argument been made, Abu-Shawish would be lucky he was litigating in 
the Seventh Circuit where Betts would be binding precedent. His behavior was not 
among those on the Borchard list. The court would not want to make moral judgments 
about Abu-Shawish’s conduct, and even if it did, the disqualifying misconduct must 
be separate and apart from the alleged crime, which this was not. If this case arose in 
the Fourth Circuit, where Graham was decided, it is not hard to imagine the issue 
being decided the other way. 
VI. LESSONS LEARNED 
One imagines that Edwin Borchard would today be delighted that there is a 
National Registry of Exonerations, that thirty-five states and the District of Columbia 
have wrongful conviction compensation statutes, and that the reality of wrongful 
convictions and need for exonerees to be compensated is accepted in general principle, 
if not always in specific practice. He would likely be shocked that over $728 million 
has been paid to exonerees in state statutory compensation since 1989.478 He would 
wonder why it was that 177 people on the National Registry who sought state 
compensation were denied.479 And, he would also be disappointed that his federal 
wrongful compensation statute is rarely used and seldom successful. If he and his 
statutory editor Homer Cummings were to revisit the statute, what would they do? 
Borchard and Cummings would see that there are still doubters – legislators 
worried that the undeserving would get paid. They would see that their essential task 
remains – to draft a statute that results in compensation for all the deserving and none 
 
477 United States v. Abu-Shawish, 507 F.3d 550, 554 (7th Cir. 2007); Abu-Shawish R. & R., 
supra note 436, at 17. 
478 Data on file with author.  
479 Data on file with author.  
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of those who are not. They would understand that it is not realistic to anticipate all the 
hard cases which make that task impossible. Then, the question is where the burden 
of error should fall – on the state paying a small number of those regarded as 
undeserving, or on the deserving but uncompensated exoneree?   
Borchard and Cummings did not have the benefit of history to answer that 
question. But, we do. The number of state wrongful conviction compensation statutes 
is growing, and some are being liberalized without substantial concern that they have 
gone too far by compensating the “undeserving.” It is true that a small number have 
imposed modest additional restrictions.480 However, those amendments have been in 
states with very generous and well-utilized statutes and have trimmed the 
compensatory formula. They have not been reactions to documented cases of the 
“undeserving” receiving compensation.   
With that context, they would start with the fundamental notion that the essential 
characteristic that defines the deserving is innocence. So long as a conviction were set 
aside, it should not matter why. Barriers erected to prevent the opportunity to show 
innocence result in cases like that of Maria Hernandez. Those should be taken down.  
As a result, Prong 1 should simply require that: 
(1) The petitioner’s conviction has been reversed or set aside, or on new trial 
or rehearing, the petitioner was found not guilty of such offense as appears 
from the record or certificate of the court setting aside or reversing such 
conviction. 
Nothing is gained by requiring that the conviction be reversed “on grounds that the 
petitioner is not guilty.” The plaintiff still needs to demonstrate innocence, leaving no 
possibility that someone regarded as undeserving would be compensated solely 
because they surmounted Prong 1. Most state statutes understand this and do not have 
the federal Prong 1 requirement,481 or they modify it.482 For example, Alabama 
 
480 See Gutman, supra note 3, at 401. 
481 The more recent state statutes do not impose limitations of the grounds of reversal. See 
IND. CODE § 5-2-23-1 (2020) (stating the statute applies to a person “whose conviction is 
vacated, reversed, or set aside”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-5004 (2018) (valid when “the claimant’s 
judgment of conviction was reversed or vacated and either the charges were dismissed or on 
retrial the claimant was found to be not guilty”); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 691.1755 (2017) (“The 
plaintiff's judgment of conviction was reversed or vacated and either the charges were dismissed 
or the plaintiff was determined on retrial to be not guilty. . . .”). Nevada’s offers a variation. 
NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.900 (2019) (“The person proves by a preponderance of the evidence that 
. . . [t]he judgment of conviction was reversed or vacated and the charging document was 
dismissed.”). States that retain a formulation similar to that in Section 2513(a) include: District 
of Columbia, D.C. CODE § 2-422 (2017); Hawaii, HAW. REV. STAT. § 661-B1 (2016); and 
Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, § 154(B) (2003). 
482 In Texas, for example, “wrongfully imprisoned person” includes someone who has been 
granted a writ of habeas corpus based on a court finding the person is actually innocent or if the 
state’s attorney believes defendant is actually innocent or has no inculpatory evidence. TEX. 
GOV’T CODE ANN. § 501.101 (West 2011). Washington, WASH. REV. CODE § 4.100.060 (2013), 
requires that the conviction be reversed or vacated on the grounds of “significant new 
exculpatory information.” 
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permits the reversal be on grounds consistent with innocence483 or, even better, 
Mississippi requires that it be reversed on grounds not inconsistent with innocence.484  
Thus, there is no reason to think that amending the federal statute in this way will have 
unintended consequences.   
The Prong 2(A) requirement, unexplained in the federal statute’s legislative 
history, that the plaintiff prove that they did not “commit any of the acts charged,” 
allows courts in cases like Mills to deny petitions for certificates of innocence to those 
who commit innocent acts that, separately or together, do not constitute crimes.  
Especially if a misconduct bar is retained, there is no obvious benefit to the provision.  
Courts have thus pushed back at the resulting unfairness by misreading the language 
of the statute in such a way to adopt Cummings’ preference that plaintiffs demonstrate 
innocence of crimes, not acts. It is better to fix the statute than misinterpret it. 
Parallel state wrongful conviction compensation statutes use terms like “crime,” 
“act,” or “offense” to define the thing a plaintiff must be innocent of.485 Indeed, a 
small number of states tweak to various degrees the requirement of a showing of 
innocence.486 There is no apparent evidence that these formulations have resulted in 
compensation to the undeserving. Only three states use the term “acts,” and require 
 
483 Alabama, ALA. CODE § 29-2-157 (2020). Minnesota defines “consistent with innocence” 
as either “exonerated, through a pardon or sentence commutation, based of factual innocence” 
or “exonerated because the judgment of conviction was vacated or reversed, or a new trial was 
ordered, and there is any evidence of factual innocence whether it was available at the time of 
investigation or trial or is newly discovered evidence.”). MINN. STAT. § 590.11 (2019).  
484 Mississippi, MISS. CODE. ANN. § 11-44-7 (2009). Massachusetts uses an unfortunate 
formulation that the grounds of reversal “tend to establish the innocence of the individual.” 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258A, § 1 (2018). 
485 See, e.g., Florida, FLA. STAT. § 961.02 (2017) (act or offense); Hawaii, HAW. REV. STAT. 
§ 661-B1 (2016) (crimes); Illinois, 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-702 (2014) (“offenses”); Indiana, 
IND. CODE § 5-2-23-2 (2020) (offense or criminal act); Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-5004 
(2018) (crime or crimes); Mississippi, MISS. CODE. ANN. § 11-44-7 (2009) (felony or felonies); 
North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148-82 (2012) (charge or charges); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. 
§ 501.101 (West 2011) (crime); Washington, WASH. REV. CODE § 4.100.060 (2013) (illegal 
conduct). 
486 Colorado, for example, requires a showing of actual innocence, but defines it as including 
findings that “his or her conviction was the result of a miscarriage of justice” and that “he or 
she presented reliable evidence that he or she was factually innocent.” COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-
65-101(I)(a)(I), (II) (2018). Ohio includes in the definition of a “wrongfully imprisoned 
individual” those who after sentencing or during or after imprisonment found a Brady violation 
which resulted in their release. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.48(A)(5) (West 2019).  
Connecticut perhaps goes the furthest in dispensing with the innocence requirement altogether.  
In Connecticut, a person may show eligibility for compensation if their conviction was vacated 
or reversed “on grounds of innocence,” or on a ground “citing an act or omission that constitutes 
malfeasance or other serious misconduct” by a state agent. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-102uu 
(2020). Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-327.11 (2020), requires those who seek a writ of actual 
innocence to allege factual innocence, but that appears to require only that newly discovered 
evidence, when combined with the existing record, “will prove that no rational trier of fact 
would have found proof of guilt or delinquency beyond a reasonable doubt”.   
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the plaintiff to demonstrate innocence of each constituent element of a crime that is 
not a status.487    
Thus, alternative redrafts of Prong 2(A) should make clear the burden of proof, 
and would require that the plaintiff allege and prove: 
“by a preponderance of the evidence that the petitioner did not commit the 
crime or crimes for which they were convicted;”488 
“by a preponderance of the evidence that the Petitioner did not engage in the 
illegal conduct for which they were convicted;”489 
“by a preponderance of the evidence that the petitioner is innocent of the 
crime or crimes for which they were convicted;”490 or, 
“by a preponderance of the evidence that the petitioner is innocent of the 
crime or crimes for which they were convicted because no crime was 
committed, or the crime was not committed by the petitioner.”491 
The burden still rests on the plaintiff to demonstrate innocence, and caselaw makes 
it clear that the reversal of the conviction alone is not enough to establish innocence.492  
It is important to include the burden of proof in the statute as an express legislative 
charge against “room thinking.” The standard, and preferably the legislative history 
of the amendment, should remind courts that it is not the obligation of plaintiffs to 
demonstrate that they are “altogether” or “truly” innocent of the crime for which they 
were wrongly convicted if “altogether” or “truly” means that the record must leave no 
evidentiary doubt of their innocence.   
Borchard might rewrite Prong 2(B) in a way somewhat narrower that he originally 
conceived of it. He would demand that plaintiff also show that his conduct related to 
the crime for which the plaintiff was wrongly convicted did not constitute any 
uncharged crimes. If federal prosecutors make accurate and comprehensive charging 
 
487 See D.C. CODE § 2-422(a)(4) (2017) (using language very close to the federal statute); 
Nevada, NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.900(2)(b) (2019) (stating plaintiff must show that he or she did 
“not commit the acts that were the basis of the conviction”); New York, N.Y. CT. CL. ACT LAW 
§ 8-b(5)(c) (McKinney 2020) (stating plaintiff must prove “he did not commit any of the acts 
charged”). 
488 IND. CODE ANN. § 5-2-23-2 (2020); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-5004 (2018); LA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 572:8 (2019); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258A, § 1 (2018); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.900 (2019); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 52:4C-3 (West 2013); OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, § 154(B) (2003); UTAH CODE ANN. § 
78B-9-404 (West 2012). 
489 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 5574(a) (2015); WASH. REV. CODE § 4.100.060 (2013).  
490 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-702 (2014); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-4603 (2009); N.H. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 541-B:14 (2018); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148-82 (2012); WIS. STAT. § 775.05 (2019). 
491 CAL. PENAL CODE § 4903(a) (West 2020); IOWA CODE § 822.2 (2020); MISS. CODE. ANN. 
§ 11-44-7 (2020); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.48(A)(5) (West 2019).   
492 See Wrongful Conviction, supra note 142. It should not be necessary to include this caveat 
in the statute, but some state compensation statutes have. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-65-101 
(2018). 
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decisions (which did not occur in Abu- Shawish), it should not be necessary to require 
the plaintiff to prove that their conduct did not violate any uncharged federal 
crimes.493 But, Borchard’s conception of the deserving would argue in favor of a 
requirement that they disprove any similar state crimes that could have been charged 
by local district attorneys. Thus, Prong 2(B) might read: 
“by a preponderance of the evidence, petitioner did not commit the crime or 
crimes charged and his or her acts, deeds, or omissions in connection with 
such charge constituted no offense against the relevant494 State, or Territory, 
including the District of Columbia.” 
At the same time, there is something uncomfortable about requiring the plaintiff 
to prove their innocence of uncharged crimes. What crimes? This could be resolved in 
the ordinary course of litigation if the government files a pre-trial motion for summary 
judgment. Presumably, if the government believes there was a Prong 2(B) issue, that 
motion would identify the potential uncharged crime(s) and offer an explanation as to 
why the plaintiff’s conduct stood in violation of it or them. 
Otherwise, a variation of the burden shifting concept would call upon the court or 
administrative entity to ask the government to identify those uncharged crimes, if any.  
Then, the burden would shift to the plaintiff to show that their conduct did not 
constitute a violation of them. Hawaii, alone among the states, has an inventive way 
of dealing with this problem. In Hawaii, the plaintiff’s commission of other related 
crimes is specifically an affirmative defense that the government must prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence.495 
Prong 3 was not particularly difficult for Borchard or Congress, which essentially 
cut and pasted his language into the statute. But, as explained, the examples of 
misconduct that Borchard put in the Borchard list, are significantly narrower than the 
statute’s broader language otherwise contemplates. That language has been (in 
Graham for example) applied to bar compensation in cases beyond those in which the 
plaintiff intended to mislead the government as to the perpetrator of the crime.   
One option is to get rid of the misconduct bar altogether. After all, by making 
Prong 2(A) and 2(B) conjunctive, we are already asking plaintiffs to demonstrate that 
their uncharged conduct did not constitute a crime. Thus, the worst form of misconduct 
causing the prosecution has been taken care of. The remaining scope of the misconduct 
bar disqualifies those whose noncriminal but suspicious or morally dubious behavior 
attracted the attention of law enforcement. This requires courts to make difficult 
assessments of these acts or omissions and to assess the causal link between them and 
 
493 For this reason, it should not be necessary for state wrongful conviction compensation 
statutes to require the plaintiff to demonstrate that their conduct did not constitute any uncharged 
state offenses. Even so, a number of state statutes specifically, but varyingly, require the plaintiff 
to show that he or she did not commit lesser included offenses, did not conspire to commit the 
crime in question, serve as an accessory and/or did not aid and abet those who did. COLO. REV. 
STAT. § 13-65-101 (2018); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.900 (2019); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 691.1755 
(2017). 
494 I included the word “relevant” to specify that the possible crime be in the same 
jurisdiction. If the alleged crime occurred in Iowa, it should not matter that the acts, deeds or 
omission would have been a crime in Arkansas if committed there. 
495 HAW. REV. STAT. § 661-B1 (2016). 
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the prosecution. Many states, without apparent problems, have not included 
misconduct bars in their wrongful conviction compensation statutes.496   
An alternative would be to hew more closely to the Borchard list and disqualify 
those whose act or omissions not only mislead the police, but who intend to do so.  
Four states have provisions along these lines, but rather than embodying the list 
concept, they use examples of such conduct. Washington’s is a good example: 
“claimant did not commit or suborn perjury, or fabricate evidence to cause or bring 
about his or her conviction.”497 The use of the word “to” suggests that the acts were 
intended to cause the result. A different formulation that borrows from the cases would 
read: “the petitioner did not, by their acts or omissions, intend to mislead law 
enforcement authorities as to the actual perpetrator of the crime.” 
For some, including Borchard, that is not an entirely satisfactory result because it 
does not disqualify someone like Valle or, depending on how you feel about them, 
Betts and Graham. A number of state compensation statutes, including several in 
which the number of claims filed and granted is quite high, essentially track the 
language of Section 2513(b).498 But, relatively few claimants lose on misconduct 
grounds. There are three imperfect, alternative ways of dealing with this problem. 
The first would be to give the court equitable authority to deal with them. The 
provision might read: “in the interests of justice, the court may decline to grant a 
certificate of innocence on the ground that the petitioner engaged in acts or omissions, 
not to include a guilty plea or coerced confession, that caused their conviction.” Such 
open-ended discretion can solve the Valle problem, but runs the potential risk of use 
against others, like Gates, regarded as more deserving. 
 The second would be to give the Court of Federal Claims authority, in the interests 
of justice, to decline to award the full $50,000 per year amount. Instead, they would 
be called upon to make a judgment as to the nature, severity, and causal connection 
between the act or omission and the conviction. This would not be a comparative 
negligence sort of calculation499 because the court would not compare the relative 
faults of the claimant and the government. In many wrongful conviction cases, there 
is no demonstrable fault of the government.   
 
496 ALA. CODE § 29-2-157 (2020); CAL. PENAL CODE § 4903(a) (West 2020); CONN. GEN. 
STAT. § 54-102uu (2020); IND. CODE § 5-2-23-1 (2020); IOWA CODE §822.2 (2020); LA. STAT. 
ANN. § 15:572.8 (2019); MO. REV. STAT. § 650.058 (2020); MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & 
PROC. § 10-501 (West 2020); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-44-7 (2020); MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-1-
214 (2020); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 541-B:14 (2018); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148-82 (2020); OHIO 
REV. CODE § 2743.48(A)(5) (West 2019); OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, § 154(B) (2020); TENN. CODE 
ANN. § 40-27-109 (2020); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 103.002 (West 2020); UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 78B-9-404 (West 2020). 
497 See WASH. REV. CODE § 4.100.060 (2020); see also MINN. STAT. § 590.11 (2020); MISS. 
CODE. ANN. § 11-44-7 (2020); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-4603 (2020). Vermont’s statute does not 
include an intent requirement. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 5574(a) (2020). 
498 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-702 (2020); D.C. CODE § 2-422 (2020); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-
5004 (2020); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4C-3 (West 2020); N.Y. CT. CL. ACT LAW § 8-b(5)(c) 
(McKinney 2020); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.900 (2020); VA. CODE ANN. 19.2-327.11 (2020). 
499 Adam I. Kaplan, The Case for Comparative Fault in Compensating the Wrongfully 
Convicted, 56 UCLA L. REV. 227, 256 (2008). 
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The third is to look not at past misconduct, but to future behavior as many state 
statutes do.500 Here, the $50,000 per year award would be paid in installments over 
time, rather than on a lump sum basis. Continued receipt of those installments would 
be conditioned on the recipient not being convicted of any future crime. Installment 
payments impose a measure of financial discipline on prevailing plaintiffs, and a 
future misconduct bar provides an incentive to avoid future criminal activity.   
These statutory amendments and recommended approaches to implementing the 
preponderance of the evidence standard will result in a statute that is truer to 
Borchard’s vision and Cummings’ draftsmanship. They would better meet the drafting 
challenge that these compensation statutes present by permitting more exonerees an 
opportunity to present their substantive claims of innocence and creating a more 
balanced way of evaluating those claims through a burden shifting methodology. The 
result will not be revolutionary, but calls for substantially more liberal statutes are 
unlikely to gain considerable legislative traction in the budgetary environments we are 
likely to see in the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, these reforms may bend the arc 
of justice a bit further in favor of those who so badly need it. 





























500 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 29-2-161(e) (2020); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-3-114(7)(b) (2020); 
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 103.154(a) (West 2020); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-9-
405(3)(b) (West 2020) (payments tolled during incarceration for subsequent felony). 
69Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2021
